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Introduction 
 
 
This dissertation addresses the debate about the proper role of religion in the 
public sphere. However, this is not ‗yet another thesis‘ on the subject, because it is 
approached from a point of view that is usually overlooked by contemporary 
political philosophers. Namely, the relationship between majoritarian social 
norms, usually reinforced by religious institutions and the law, and oppressed 
social groups.  
The current diagnosis of the debate about ―public religions‖ is that the 
western notion of the secular state and the liberal conception of toleration need to 
be reshaped. The steady, or even increasing, presence of religion in the public 
sphere has led many scholars to think that the secular state is in crisis.
1
 The 
traditional separation between the state and the churches, or between politics and 
religion, is not perceived anymore as promoting the bases for respectful 
coexistence. Recent controversies in Europe, such as the headscarves affair in 
France or the Swiss ban on constructions of minarets, are interpreted as signs of 
                                                 
1
 Rajeev Bhargava, ―Rehabilitating Secularism,‖ in Rethinking Secularism, ed. Craig Calhoun, 
Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (92-113: Oxford University Press, USA, 
2011); Lorenzo Zucca, ―The Crisis of the Secular State—A Reply to Professor Sajó,‖ 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 7, no. 3 (July 1, 2009): 494–514, 
doi:10.1093/icon/mop010; András Sajó, ―Preliminaries to a Concept of Constitutional 
Secularism,‖ International Journal of Constitutional Law 6, no. 3–4 (July 1, 2008): 605–29, 
doi:10.1093/icon/mon018; Jürgen Habermas, ―Religion in the Public Sphere,‖ European Journal 
of Philosophy 14, no. 1 (April 1, 2006): 1–25, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2006.00241.x; Jean 
Baubérot, ―The Two Thresholds of Laicization,‖ in Secularism and Its Critics, ed. Rajeev 
Bhargava (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 94–136. 
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the incapacity of the secular state to deal with the challenges of contemporary 
pluralism.  
Consequently, the dominant position among political philosophers 
addressing the question of the proper role of religion in the public sphere is that 
the secular state cannot insist on its traditional requirements given the 
diversification of immigration and the transformation of religious beliefs in 
contemporary democracies. It is concluded that, in its traditional conception, the 
secular state is unable to deal with diversity. As a response to this diagnosis, 
philosophers have developed more flexible interpretations of the requirements of 
secularism and therefore have made the separation between politics and religion 
more permeable. This position receives several names and all suggest some 
degree of openness towards diversity: liberal pluralism, value pluralism, ethics of 
diversity, post-secular ethics, open secularism, multicultural secularism, post 
secular liberalism and so on.
2
 
In the dissertation I argue that such developments do indeed address some 
of the challenges deep religious and cultural pluralism raise to democracies. 
However, I argue that they leave some important issues unaddressed, particularly 
in societies where there is a politically and socially influent religious institution 
                                                 
2
 Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, trans. Jane Marie 
Todd (Harvard University Press, 2011); William A. Galston, The Practice of Liberal Pluralism 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004); William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of 
Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Lorenzo 
Zucca, A Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape (Oxford 
University Press, 2012); Habermas, ―Religion in the Public Sphere‖; Alessandro Ferrara, ―The 
Separation of Religion and Politics in a Post-Secular Society,‖ Philosophy & Social Criticism 35, 
no. 1–2 (January 1, 2009): 77–91, doi:10.1177/0191453708098755; Gérard Bouchard and Charles 
Taylor, Building the Future. A Time for Reconciliation (Quebec: Government of Quebec, 2008); 
Jean Baubérot, Une laïcité interculturelle : Le Québec, avenir de la France ? (La Tour d‘Aigues: 
Editions de l‘Aube, 2008); Kevin Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation 
(New York: Routledge, 2014). 
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that claims to be representative of the religious and cultural identities of the 
majority of the population. I analyze cases in which new expressions of moral 
pluralism challenge consolidated social norms and their respective crystallizations 
into legislation. Hence, the fundamental question the dissertation addresses is:  
 
What is required by the commitment to protect pluralism in cases where 
social groups are oppressed by social norms that are reinforced by the 
majority, the law, or powerful religious institutions?  
 
 
1. Pluralism, liberal toleration, and the crisis of secularism  
Protection of pluralism is at the core of liberalism as a political theory. States 
must seek order, security, peace, economic growth, and so on, but they cannot 
carry out such tasks disregarding citizens‘ life plans and meaningful choices for 
life. They cannot, however, coercively determine the content of what is best for 
citizens, because matters of conscience, such as defining what is worth in life and 
what the ultimate meaning of life is, are matters of personal conviction and 
choice.
3
 Thus, according to the liberal tradition, states must respect citizens‘ 
diverse choices, preferences, lifestyles, and beliefs. Historically, the birth of 
liberalism is associated with the commitment by states to protect diversity, which 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was identified with religious 
diversity.
4
 From its origins, the liberal commitment to protect diversity has 
signified a commitment to toleration.  
                                                 
3
 This is a close description of Martha Nussbaum‘s definition of religion, see Martha Nussbaum, 
Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality, Paperback Edition 
(Basic Books, 2009), 167–174. 
4
 The birth of liberalism, and its conception of toleration, is nowadays conventionally associated 
with the European Wars of Religion. Political philosophers have standardized Rawls‘ story of this 
origin as described in Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition, 2nd ed. (Columbia University 
10 
 
The liberal practice of toleration, understood also as the separation of the 
functions of civil and religious institutions, was interpreted as a measure that 
protected religions from the interference of the state (e.g., the civic authorities 
cannot determine what the right interpretation of religion is) and the state from 
religious interference (e.g. religious institutions cannot use the institutions of the 
state to impose their worldview upon all citizens).  
Contemporary philosophers argue, however, that in this process 
intellectual and historical biases against religion played a fundamental role. One 
of these this biases is the so called ―secularization thesis.‖5 
Nineteenth century philosophers and the fathers of sociology shared the 
idea that religion was on the path of constant and unavoidable decline. For a long 
time, this assumption was neither tested nor intellectually challenged.
6
 The legacy 
of the Enlightenment, the process of industrialization and capitalism, and the 
advancements of science created an intellectual environment in which 
Feuerbach‘s opinion was widely shared: 
Christianity has in fact long vanished, not only from the reason but from 
the like of mankind, that it is nothing more than a fixed idea, in flagrant 
contradiction with our fire and life assurance companies, our railroads and 
steam carriages our picture and sculpture galleries, our military and 
industrial schools, our theaters and scientific museums.
7
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Press, 2005), Introduction. See also Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith, chap. 1. For an 
account of the birth of liberalism from the field of intellectual history, see Perez Zagorin, How the 
Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: Princeton University 
Press, 2005). 
5
 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 
1994); Jose Casanova, ―Secularization, Religion, and Multicultural Citizenship,‖ in Religio ns and 
Dialogue  International Approaches, ed. Wolfram Wei e, Katajun Amirpur, and Anna K rs, 
Religionen Im Dialog (M nster, Westf: Waxmann Verlag GmbH, 2014), 21–32. 
6
 Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, 17. 
7
 Feuerbach, quoted in Ibid., 35. 
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The privatization of religious belief was interpreted as a sign of the process of 
religions‘ decline. Religions were moved toward less relevant roles in the 
determination of societies‘ definition of their common interests and in the 
individuals‘ definition of their life plans. According to the secularization thesis, 
the search for meaning was confined to be a matter of private, individual choice.
8
 
Being private, religion ceased to be an obstacle in the way individuals within 
societies made cooperative decisions. Civil and religious interests were more or 
less neatly distinguished and therefore the function of the state—the civil 
authority—and the function of the churches—religious authorities—ceased to be 
in conflict. The functional distinction between the authority of civil and religious 
institutions settled the grounding basis of European secular states. For some time, 
this distinction performed fairly well in guaranteeing peaceful coexistence among 
religions.
9
 Locke‘s treaties on toleration represent an illustrative example of the 
association between the conditions of possibility of peaceful coexistence among 
diverse religions and the understanding of religion as a private matter.
10
 
The secular state, however, started to face difficulties once its grounds 
were made explicit and challenged. One of the first weaknesses that emerged was 
that privatization of religion was identified as a process intrinsic to Christianity. 
                                                 
8
 Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society., First 
edition (MacMillan Publishing Company, 1967). 
9
 This affirmation, however, is partially true. Intolerance was pervasive against atheists and 
Catholics.  Locke‘s famous arguments against tolerating Catholics and atheists are famous 
examples of the shortcomings of early liberal toleration. Jeremy Waldron, however, claims that 
Locke does not argue against tolerating Catholics, but only against atheists. For Waldron‘s 
analysis of Locke‘s arguments, see Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality: Christian 
Foundations in Locke’s Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2002), chap. 8. 
10
 John Locke, ―A Letter Concerning Toleration,‖ in Two Treatises of Government and A Letter 
Concerning Toleration, ed. Ian Shapiro (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 2003), 
211–54. 
12 
 
The ―Protestantization of religious belief,‖11 as the process of privatization is 
usually called, is the transformation of the religious experience into something 
that concerns mainly the individual and her private life. Hence, the autonomy of 
the religious and the political spheres was fueled by the transformations that 
Christianity in particular—and not religion in general—had undertaken.  
The secular state faced a second sort of challenge once its real scope was 
made apparent. As it is usually presented, religious toleration is a product of the 
fragmentation of the Christian Church into diverse denominations. The new 
churches were then forced, painfully, to learn to coexist in the same territory. 
Religious toleration and the mutual autonomy of civic and religious institutions, it 
turned out, was restricted to a relationship the state undertook with Christian 
Churches. The mutual commitment to non-interference made by the churches and 
the state was grounded on the assumption of a common moral ground. Charles 
Taylor refers to this mode of secularism as the ―common ground strategy‖ model. 
Christianity had provided an ethic for peaceful coexistence and political order 
because it was grounded on the common features all Christian sects shared.
12
 
Accordingly, the function of the state was to remain equidistant from all religious 
communities, without ―backing one confession rather than the other.‖13 
The contemporary crisis of secularism and toleration, it is sometimes 
pointed out, is due to the insistence to maintain the Christian common ethic as the 
guarantor of peaceful and respectful coexistence. It is argued that contemporary 
                                                 
11
 Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience. 
12
 Charles Taylor, ―Modes of Secularism,‖ in Secularism and Its Critics, ed. Rajeev Bhargava 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 33. 
13
 Ibid., 35. 
13 
 
controversies regarding the public role of religion are due to the fact that the 
common morality is fragmented and that such fragmentation leads to a lack of 
social cohesion. In order to remedy this problem, some European scholars have 
argued that the European Union needs to emulate the United States‘ tradition of 
having a non-denominational Christian civil religion. In doing so, the European 
Union would rehabilitate its threatened identitarian roots. Consequently, it has 
been argued that the legal documents defining the constitutional identity of the 
European Union (e.g. a future written political constitution) need to invoke 
Christian values.
14
 
These two challenges revealed the weaknesses of the secular state and its 
associated conception of religious toleration. Not surprisingly, this became 
noticeable when societies faced the intensification of diversity, which assembled 
in the same soil a wide diversity of religions and cultures. The way religion is 
experienced in western societies cannot anymore be explained with reference to 
historical and cultural processes that took place within western states. Neither the 
Protestantization of religious belief nor the ‗common ground ethic‘ are plausible 
descriptions of contemporary religiosity in contemporary western democracies.
15
 
In addition to Christian communities, western states contain substantial numbers 
of Muslims, Hindus, or Buddhists from whom it is unreasonable to expect to share 
features that are most likely to be dependent from western historical processes.
16
 
                                                 
14
 Zucca, A Secular Europe, chap. 4; Joseph H.H Weiler, Un’Europa cristiana: un saggio 
esplorativo (Milan: Rizzoli University, 2003). 
15
 Bhargava, ―Rehabilitating Secularism,‖ 101. 
16
 Taylor, ―Modes of Secularism,‖ 36. 
14 
 
The diversification of immigration challenges the conception of the 
secular state because some of these religions and cultures do not draw a clear 
boundary between the private and the public spheres in the way Christianity 
does.
17
 Faced with this situation, secular states have two options: either they foster 
privatization of religious beliefs and practices among the new religions and 
cultures, or they modify their requirements of privatization. Some official 
secularists in France, for instance, have adopted the former option and thereby 
have justified restrictions to Muslim girls to wear headscarves when they attend 
public schools. As they claim, these are requirements that are in concordance with 
the principle of church-state separation and with the conception of the French 
state as being secular.
18
 Furthermore, they add, requiring Muslims to privatize 
their religion is coherent with the requirements raised to the Catholic Church at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. As critics point out, this attitude 
overemphasizes principles of church-state separation and promotes a secularist 
philosophy that does not respect freedom of conscience of citizens that are already 
marginalized.
19
 
                                                 
17
 Tariq Modood, ―Is There a Crisis of Secularism in Western Europe?,‖ Sociology of Religion, 
May 4, 2012, 130–49, doi:10.1093/socrel/srs028. 
18
 Church-state separation in France is troublesome due to its history of hostility against religion. 
The 1905 Law of Separation, however, is almost unanimously interpreted as a measure respectful 
of pluralism and freedom of conscience. For an influential historical account of French 
development of secularism, see Jean Baubérot, Histoire de la laïcité en France (Paris: Presses 
Univ. de France, 2007). For the particularities of French secularism with regards to its Anglo-
Saxon counterpart, see Cécile Laborde, ―Toleration and Laïcité,‖ in The Culture of Toleration in 
Diverse Societies. Reasonable Tolerance (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 
2003), 161–78. 
19
 Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, 29. For a brief historical  account 
of the confrontation between laïcité and Islam, see Baubérot, ―The Two Thresholds of 
Laicization,‖ 130–136. For a comprehensive philosophical study about the headscarves 
controversies in France, see Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism. The Hijab Controversy and 
Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
15 
 
A second social process leading to diversification of contemporary 
societies can be explained in Rawlsian terms.
20
 Reasonable pluralism, which is the 
diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, is the inevitable outcome of free 
human reason within the framework of free institutions. Free institutions are those 
that do not impose their power upon their citizens without a valid (e.g. public) 
justification. In particular, they do not seek unity of the political community by 
affirming one moral doctrine, even if it is a reasonable one. Regardless of 
processes of immigration, in a democratic regime there will always be pluralism 
of reasonable doctrines and the institutions of the state are required to avoid 
interference with such pluralism. Rawls‘ influential solution to the challenge that 
reasonable pluralism poses to the liberal state is what he calls an ―overlapping 
consensus.‖ Broadly stated, it is the convergence of all reasonable moral doctrines 
on a set of shared political values whose validity does not necessitate any of the 
reasonable moral doctrines.
21
 
Critics of the Rawlsian approach argue that the characteristics of an 
―overlapping consensus‖ do not take religious beliefs seriously. In particular, it is 
commonly argued that it is biased in favor of citizens that endorse secular moral 
worldviews, for their moral reasons supporting their political decisions are more 
likely linked to the political values that constitute the overlapping consensus. 
                                                 
20
 Here I follow Rawls, Political Liberalism, 36–37. For a definition of what a ―reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine‖ is, see Ibid., 58–65. 
21
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 133–172; Taylor, ―Modes of Secularism.‖ I do not intend to take a 
position on the ‗consensus-convergence‘ debate here. What I want to emphasize is Rawls‘ 
proposal not to support his theory on a sectarian moral worldview. For the mentioned debate, see 
Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith; Kevin Vallier, ―Against Public Reason Liberalism‘s 
Accessibility Requirement,‖ Journal of Moral Philosophy 8, no. 3 (October 1, 2011): 366–89, 
doi:10.1163/174552411X588991; Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (OUP Oxford, 
2011), chap. 6. 
16 
 
Thus, secular citizens are less likely faced to the tragic decision choosing between 
their most cherished values and the values of the political system they belong to. 
On the other side, religious citizens are required to accept that their religious 
reasons supporting their political views have a less justificatory power and 
therefore that they need to find non-religious reasons (e.g. public reasons) in order 
to support them.
22
 Critics reject this requirement for a number of reasons. Some 
argue that it impinges religious citizens to live according to their most 
fundamental religious values and therefore to live their lives with integrity.
23
 
Others argue that such requirement is biased against religion, for it raises 
requirements to religious citizens only.
24
  
Hence, pluralism emerges as a consequence of at least two social 
phenomena. On the one side, diversification of immigration physically assemblies  
religions and cultures from all over the world; and, on the other side, the free 
development of new moral worldviews, accompanied by the—slow—social 
acceptance of such views. Both of them seem to challenge the grounding basis of 
the liberal idea of toleration, for they depart from the assumptions of a common 
Christian root and the acceptance of the public-private divide. 
When it is focused on the first social phenomenon mentioned, the debate 
about the role of religion in the public sphere has been addressed as a question 
about whether and how to extend rights to equal freedom of conscience to the new 
                                                 
22
 John Rawls, ―The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,‖ The University of Chicago Law Review 64, 
no. 3 (July 1, 1997): 765–807, doi:10.2307/1600311. 
23
 Christopher J. Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics, 1st ed. (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002); Christopher J Eberle, ―Basic Human Worth and Religious Restraint,‖ Philosophy & 
Social Criticism 35, no. 1–2 (January 1, 2009): 151–81, doi:10.1177/0191453708098759. 
24
 Habermas, ―Religion in the Public Sphere.‖ This argument, however, can be contested by 
arguing that all—and not only religious ones—sectarian worldviews have lower justificatory 
power.   
17 
 
religious and cultural expressions of pluralism. Thus, the so-called crisis of 
secularism refers mainly to the failed attempt of western states to properly 
respond to claims from immigrants of non-Christian origins. 
In contrast, when it is focused on the second social phenomenon, the 
debate has been addressed in terms of the nature of the reasons individuals can 
legitimately bring into political deliberations. This branch of the debate has 
focused on the epistemic aspects of reason-giving processes in a context of 
reasonable pluralism. From this point of view, the crisis of (liberal) secularism 
consists in the inability to give religious citizens due respect.  
 
2. Pluralism and the claims of (non-religious) minorities 
It is comprehensible that contemporary debates on secularism and the role of 
religion in the public sphere focus primarily on the controversies related to the 
new religions that today populate western democracies. After all, the liberal 
notions of secularism and toleration are in dealing with religious diversity. 
However, these debates cannot leave aside expressions of pluralism that are not 
related to religion. A challenge that the developments on the understanding of 
secularism bear is that it tends to assign religion a special status and therefore 
attributes a higher value to religious-based claims over claims of conscience that 
are not grounded on religious convictions. 
It is sometimes argued that religion serves to protect a distinct and unique 
human good from state interference. Accordingly, it is argued that freedom of 
religion and freedom of conscience are separate freedoms and that religious 
claims for exemptions and accommodation are to be treated separately. In order to 
18 
 
tackle the immediate objection this view receives, the notion of ‗religion‘ is 
extended to cover a broad set of commitments of conscience searching for 
ultimate meaning. Thus, not only institutionalized religions, but also individual, 
non-theistic, naturalistic, polytheistic, and secular commitments of conscience are 
considered to provide with special claims against state‘s interference.25 
Egalitarian criticisms to these accounts argue that by singling out religion 
as a phenomenon that requires special treatment and protection, the state is 
creating a division between first and second class citizens.
26
 First, since it is 
grounded on the recognition of special status to religion, it faces the difficult task 
to define what religion is. The risk this task carries is to dismiss as non-religion 
what other definitions would have considered as such. Or to consider as ‗religion‘ 
commitments that do not have any appeal for being treated as such. And second, it 
draws a distinction between citizens with deep commitments of conscience and 
citizens without them, deeming the latter to a second-class category.
27
 
                                                 
25
 For instance, during the Vietnam War, The U.S Supreme Court had to decide numerous cases of 
conscience objection. Equal treatment to religious and non-religious conscience-commitments 
required a criterion to grant the exceptions. The Supreme Court came up with this standard: [an 
exception is granted whenever…] ―a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its 
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the 
exception,‖ Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience, 171. 
26
 For a recent account of the main thesis of egalitarian theories of religious freedom, see Cécile 
Laborde, ―Equal Liberty, Non-Establishment and Religious Freedom,‖ Legal Theory, 2013. 
27
 This is a rather paradoxical claim. One of the most common criticisms liberalism receives is that 
it is hostile towards religious citizens, for it unfairly requires them to subsume their religious 
beliefs to the norms of the state. Accordingly, a good deal of the defenses of liberal politics deals 
with demonstrating why there is no hostility against religion. For this debate, see Vallier, Liberal 
Politics and Public Faith; Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics; Robert Audi, 
Democratic Authority and the Separation of Church and State (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011); Robert Audi, ―The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of 
Citizenship,‖ Philosophy & Public Affairs 18, no. 3 (July 1, 1989): 259–96; Nicholas Wolterstorff 
and Robert Audi, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political 
Debate (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996); Cristina Lafont, ―Religion in the 
Public Sphere: Remarks on Habermas‘s Conception of Public Deliberation in Postsecular 
Societies,‖ Constellations 14, no. 2 (June 1, 2007): 239–59, doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8675.2007.00436.x. 
19 
 
In their search for a ‗meaning in life,‘ individuals can appeal to a wide 
array of options, some of which are religious, while some others are not.
28
 
However, pluralism is not reduced to different ways individuals to find answers to 
their existential questions. Pluralism also refers to the transformation in the social 
norms that define social relations within a particular community. Societies are 
more open, or more permeable, to new definitions of what is considered to be 
―normal.‖ The long-lasting marriage between liberalism and pluralism made 
democracies a favorable environment for transformations in the social norms 
regulating relations among individuals. Consequently, democratic institutions 
need to be flexible enough as to adapt in such a way that new social norms find a 
place. The obvious question here is whether democratic institutions are flexible 
enough.  
One clear example of these transformations—and how difficult is for 
societies‘ institutions to adapt to new dynamics—is the way gender roles have 
changed during the last decades. The idea that men and women have fixed roles in 
contemporary societies is not plausible anymore. Yet societies are still struggling 
to adapt their institutions as to avoid interfering with new social dynamics that 
challenge the historical gender division. Contemporary debates about abortion, 
paid maternity leave (in the U.S), discrimination laws, or marriage laws, portray 
the difficulties contemporary democracies face in adjusting themselves to new 
expressions of pluralism that challenge the gender divide. 
                                                 
28
 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, First Edition (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 
Introduction. 
20 
 
Similar circumstances are found in debates about homosexuality. 
Although laws prohibiting sodomy have been removed in liberal regimes and 
homosexuals are granted free and equal citizenship, they still experience several 
civil disabilities. Particularly noticeable is the case of same-sex marriage. On the 
one hand, levels of social acceptance of homosexuality are increasing and 
activists for the rights of sexual minorities have instituted organized movements 
that can form real political forces. On the other hand, political communities have 
been very reluctant in accepting reforms in the institutions that discriminate 
against gay people. In most liberal and democratic states, the state does not 
recognize on equal grounds non-heterosexual families.  
Although none of these cases is a clear-cut case of the role of religion in 
the public sphere, religion certainly gets involved in the way these issues are 
addressed—particularly in the latter one. Religions, more specifically 
institutionalized ones, have strong stands about gender roles and homosexuality. 
These opinions, however, are not homogeneous across religions: some defend 
strict gender roles and discriminate women, while others proclaim gender 
equality. Some religions condemn homosexuality and fiercely oppose to state 
recognition of same sex couples as families; others ordinate homosexuals and 
welcome them in their community. Still, religious institutions and organizations 
have a public say in debates concerning their fundamental beliefs. When dealing 
with issues related to sexual conduct, such as female liberation from the 
traditional institution of family and acceptance of homosexuality, these public 
voices become more stringent. 
 
21 
 
 
3. Plan of the thesis  
In this dissertation I focus on the public and political opposition the Catholic 
Church displays against advancements seeking transformations of social and legal 
norms. In particular, the focus is on cases in which social and legal norms are 
supported by powerful and majoritarian institutions (e.g. the Roman Catholic 
Church in southern Europe) and on how they interact with ‗new‘ expressions of 
pluralism.
29
The dissertation is divided in two parts. The first one, ―Toleration and 
Majorities,‖ deals with problems in which majoritarian social and legal norms 
hinder the free development of new forms of pluralism. The three chapters 
contained in this part address questions such as: Is deliberative democracy biased 
in favor of majoritarian or well entrenched social norms? What is the proper 
relation a democratic state, which is committed to toleration and non-domination 
of powerless social groups, should establish with majorities that support illiberal 
social and legal norms? And, can a democratic state promote the reduction of 
domination of powerless social groups in contexts where oppressive social and 
legal norms seem to be widely shared by the whole society?  
 Accordingly, in Chapter One, ―Deliberative Democracy and the Power of 
Majorities‖, I explore the advantages and disadvantages of the deliberative 
conception of democracy to deal with a particular expression of pluralism, 
namely, reasonable moral disagreement. I argue that the ‗politics of compromise,‘ 
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Reason Alone: Catholicism, Constitutions, and Sex in the Americas,‖ International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 10, no. 2 (March 30, 2012): 493–511, doi:10.1093/icon/mor060. 
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which is one of the most salient features of deliberative democracy for dealing 
with reasonable disagreements, does not account for the misbalances of power in 
which the parties to a disagreement might find themselves. By neglecting power 
inequalities, the politics of compromise fails to advance political moderation, 
which is one of the virtues to which it is usually associated. As a consequence, the 
politics of compromise has problems of legitimacy because it is prone to 
legitimize policies that otherwise would have been considered as unreasonable 
and, in some cases, oppressive. Solving moral disagreements by appealing to the 
politics of compromise, I conclude, risks leaving social groups defending 
unpopular moral claims systematically and unfairly overheard.  
 In chapter two, ―On Tolerating Majorities,‖ I challenge the idea that a 
morally sound conception of toleration entails a relationship between a liberal 
majority and illiberal minorities, who seek exceptions and permissions to lead a 
life according to their illiberal traditions and practices. I argue that a morally 
sound conception of toleration can also be between a liberal state and an illiberal 
majority. State‘s commitment to values of free and equal citizenship requires it to 
provide the means to all citizens to enjoy such status. This might entail that the 
state expresses its disapproval towards certain beliefs the majority holds, 
including religious institutions representing the religious feeling of the majority, 
while at the same time restraining from using its coercive power to eliminate 
them. The legitimacy of such a practice is particularly evident when it comes to 
the acceptance of full equal rights to citizens demanding that their non-traditional, 
but liberal, conceptions of the family be respected and recognized.  
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 Chapter three, ―Majoritarian Beliefs and Neo-republicanism,‖ expands on 
the previous argument and provides an interpretation of such relation of toleration 
in neo-republican terminology. This chapter keeps the attention on the relation 
powerful majorities hold with powerless social groups (whether or not minorities). 
In this chapter, I address the challenge that majoritarian and oppressive beliefs 
pose to democratic states. On the one side, the state must be committed to 
reducing domination and oppression. On the other, it has to act in a way that is 
acceptable to the community, in order to preserve its legitimacy. In particular, I 
address recent criticisms raised to neo-republican political theory pointing out that 
the conception of freedom as non-domination falls short in reducing domination 
of social groups whose—legitimate—interests might not be considered as part of 
the common good of the political community. I argue that the neo-republican 
account of freedom as non-domination provides promising normative tools for 
pursuing citizens‘ independence from dominating agents, including religious 
institutions and traditionally entrenched social norms. This potential, I believe, is 
greater than some feminist criticisms to neo-republicanism are willing to 
acknowledge.  
 The two remaining chapters of the dissertation form part two, titled 
―Church-State Separation and Minorities.‖ They focus on the duties the state is 
supposed to meet in contexts where powerless social groups do not find channels 
of participation that make it possible to advance their claims. In particular, I focus 
on cases where this situation is determined by the presence of a politically active 
and institutionally powerful religious institution. The question that part two 
addresses is: what is the best institutional arrangement for protecting pluralism in 
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contexts where there is a politically active and institutionally powerful religious 
institution?  
 Accordingly, in chapter four, ―On Separation and Anticlericalism,‖ I 
explore the possibility of interpreting ‗anticlericalism‘ within the framework of 
the values of a democracy respectful of freedom and equality of all. I argue that 
not all historical and conceptual understandings of anticlericalism are antireligious 
and therefore that, as a normative concept, it should not be discarded. The 
characteristic feature I associate with the notion of anticlericalism is that while it 
confronts the excessive power of a religious institution, it does not display a 
negative attitude against religion and its public expressions. It is a political 
concept that is meant to guide the design of political institutions in their relation 
to religious institutions. I proceed to identify cases in which this notion of 
anticlericalism has been implemented and explain in which conditions it serves to 
advance moral claims of traditionally marginalized social groups. I argue that if a 
democratic state is committed to guaranteeing non-interference against 
meaningful choices of its citizens by private associations, it has to implement an 
anticlerical principle of separation that undermines such power of interference.   
In the fifth chapter, ―Italy and the Principle of (Strict) Church-State 
Separation,‖ I analyze the Italian ‗crucifixes controversy‘ and the official Italian 
conception of secularism. I also analyze the alternative proposals (e.g. post-
secular ethics and liberal pluralism) that have been made in recent years and 
assess whether they properly protect diversity in the Italian context. I conclude 
that while liberal pluralism is well equipped to address some problems related to 
immigration and integration, it does not properly address the political problem of 
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associating the state with a powerful and hegemonic Catholic Church (or 
Christian tradition). I propose a principle of strict separation that offers 
possibilities for advancing claims of excluded minorities in contexts like the 
Italian one. I argue that this principle enables excluded minorities to advance their 
claims in a context where social and legal norms are designed as to impinge on 
them. 
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PART I  
 
Toleration and Majorities 
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CHAPTER 1  
Deliberative Democracy and the Power of Majorities 
A version of democracy that promotes moderation is usually considered to be 
preferable with respect to other versions. In this chapter I show, first, that recent 
defenses of deliberative democracy emphasize on its moderation-enhancement 
properties in order to show its desirability over aggregative conceptions of 
democracy. According to deliberative democrats, moral disagreements in politics 
can find moderate resolutions if they go through a reason-giving process. Such 
resolutions are preferable because, whilst preserving criteria of liberal legitimacy, 
they can enhance moral progress in society by breaking down status-quo 
injustices. Second, I show a weakness in the argument that presents deliberative 
democracy as a moderation-enhancing system. I show that in one of the most 
recurrent examples illustrating how successfully deliberative democracy promotes 
moderation (i.e., abortion), background circumstances are playing a determining 
role in the way the issue is resolved. Thus, I show that deliberative democracy is 
also vulnerable to be ridden by status quo power relations and therefore its 
superiority over aggregative democracy becomes less clear.  
Historically, political philosophers have developed accounts of legitimacy 
in order to justify the coercive power of the state. According to Rousseau, the 
civil state can exercise its coercive power in such a way that it makes everyone a 
slave. In such a case the state‘s coercive power lacks legitimacy and is mere 
display of force. Democratic justification turns the mere exercise of coercive 
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power into a legitimate one.
1
 John Rawls‘ worries about the legitimacy of state 
power are on a similar line. According to him, the display of state power without 
consideration of citizens‘ views is a mere imposition of force and not the display 
of the power of the public, or of ―free and equal citizens as a collective body.‖2  
What these theories have in common is their endorsement of citizens‘ 
consent as a benchmark for legitimacy. This requirement, though diverse among 
political theorists, means that citizens must accept—hypothetically or actually—
that the state is not imposing on them a view they do not, or would not, endorse. 
By showing that citizens can consent to political power, political theorists have 
tried to show that political authority is neither authoritarian nor oppressive.
3
 
Accounting for political legitimacy is challenging for political philosophy because 
of the so called ―fact of reasonable pluralism.‖4 It was introduced as a key 
problem by Rawls‘ later work when he recognized its moral relevance. This fact 
is constituted by different and contradictory ―reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines,‖ which cover the ―major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of 
human life,‖ provide an organized set of values that expresses an intelligible view 
of the world, and are the result of a tradition of thought developed throughout 
history.
5
 According to Rawls, lack of consideration of the fact of reasonable 
pluralism leads to the imposition of one comprehensive doctrine, religious or non-
                                                 
1
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and The First and Second Discourses (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2002), Book I, Chapters I & VI. 
2
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 136. 
3
 See: Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse 
and Bounded World, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2010), xv–xi, Chapters 1 – 2; Rawls, 
Political Liberalism, 37. 
4
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 36. 
5
 Ibid., 59. Examples of comprehensive doctrines are Kant‘s and Mill‘s ethics, and—crucially for 
Rawls‘ purposes—the religions derived from the fragmentation of the Christian Church. 
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religious, by force only. He refers to this latter circumstance as ―the fact of 
oppression.‖6                                                   
1. Aggregative Democracy and the status-quo objection 
According to aggregative conceptions of democracy, moral conflicts in politics 
must be decided by majority rule.
7
 The radical version of this approach is 
exemplified by Rousseau‘s way of dealing with disagreements and 
majoritarianism. When a law is proposed to the assembly of the people, he says, 
each one expresses his opinion about whether or not such law conforms to the 
general will, which is discovered by the counting of votes. In cases in which ―an 
opinion opposed to my own prevails, that simply shows that I was mistaken, and 
that what I considered to be the general will was not so.‖8 Even if the general will 
is the will of the unified people and aims to the common good, Rousseau 
recognizes that in the assembly individuals might disagree in judging what the 
general will is. Such disagreements are, however, discerned by the majority, 
which is always right. Once the majority has settled the right view, those in the 
minority have to recognize their mistake and abandon their initial belief. 
According to Rousseau, they realize that had their private opinion prevailed and 
the corresponding legislation approved, their freedom would have been 
jeopardized.
9
  
 Although Rousseau‘s view is too radical, it captures the soundness of 
adopting a procedural approach to contemporary problems in politics. Democratic 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., 37. 
7
 The most prominent defense of aggregative democracy today is Jeremy Waldron, see Jeremy 
Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
8
 Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book 4; Chapter 2. 
9
 Ibid. 
30 
 
political thought is grounded on the idea that citizens are the authors of the 
legislation to which they are subjected and therefore there must be a way for them 
to identify themselves as authors even in cases in which they do not agree with 
particular legislations. Rousseau‘s view is clear, for the general will constitutes 
citizens‘ political autonomy. However, it is not clear at all what motivations 
individuals would have to recognize their error and thereby to change their minds, 
particularly in cases in which disagreements are originated by the incompatibility 
of moral values.
10
 Given that contemporary politics is invaded by what seem to be 
unresolvable disagreements, and given also that, contrary to what happens in 
everyday life or academic discussions, political decisions must be made in a 
relatively short time, appealing to majority rule procedures appears to be the 
fairest procedure to advance politics without compromising justice.  
 One advantage of solving irreducible moral conflicts in politics by 
appealing to majority rule is that a determinate outcome will always be obtained. 
This is crucial given the role value pluralism plays in nurturing moral conflicts in 
politics. In the case of abortion, which is the paradigmatic debate in which the 
views in conflict hold irreducible and conflicting values, appealing to majority 
rule would settle the problem in such a way that honors the principle of political 
equality by giving each citizen the same power (i.e., one person, one vote).
11
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 According to value pluralism, the moral world is constituted by a plurality of mutually 
irreducible moral values, see Isaiah Berlin, ―Two Concepts of Liberty,‖ in Liberty, ed. Henry 
Hardy (Oxford University Press, 2002); William A. Galston, ―Two Concepts of Liberalism,‖ 
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 As a matter of fact, Pro-Life advocates have opted for promoting referendums in order to contest 
legislations that allow abortion. A referendum in Italy (1981) ratified the law that allows women to 
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Majoritarianism‘s strength is that it is grounded on an extremely appealing 
principle of political equality. Since equal persons disagree on political issues, the 
fairest way to solve them is to give each of them equal power and align with the 
side that receives the greatest numbers of votes. Every citizen is equally qualified 
and therefore equally entitled to settle the issue.
12
   
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson find aggregative conceptions of 
democracy flawed because in their way of approaching moral conflicts in politics 
they are silent about requirements of moral reasoning. Such silence, they say, 
suggests an endorsement of a conception of politics as a bargaining process, in 
which the relative power of the parties plays a determining role of what is 
approved to rule the whole society.
13
  
 The problem with aggregative democracy is that it ―accepts and may even 
reinforce existing distributions of power in society.‖14 Majority rule mechanisms 
are grounded on the presupposition that voters will express their preferences or 
opinions ‗as they are‘ and decisions are to be made upon such expressions. No 
justificatory process is required and citizens do not have the opportunity, or the 
motivation, to undertake a process of deliberation that might lead to a better 
understanding of the issue at stake and therefore to an epistemically superior 
                                                                                                                                     
access to abortion during the first trimester. More recently (2013), a popular consultation 
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alternative.
15
 By avoiding mutual justifications and joint deliberation, aggregative 
democracy is bound to reaffirm unqualified status quo majoritarian preferences. In 
aggregative democracy there is no requirement of deliberation among the 
legislators, nor of submitting the issue at stake to experts‘ scrutiny. Instead, 
current preferences of the relevant political body determine the case. This 
proposal, they say, is vulnerable to be influenced by distributions of bargain 
power and therefore to be determined by them.   
2. Deliberative Democracy and Moderation  
The alternative to aggregative democracy is the so called deliberative 
democracy.
16
 The main difference between these two conceptions of democracy is 
that the latter requires citizens to undertake a process of reasons-giving in which 
their views are publicly assessed and mutually justified. Citizens are required to 
engage in critical revision of their views and, if it is the case, to be ready to 
abandon or modify them. Deliberative democrats consider deliberation to be 
healthy for democracy as it contributes to find the best policy to be adopted—
whether in terms of being the best means to advance the common good or in terms 
of being better justified to all citizens. Decisions over specific policies are made 
after deliberation processes. For this reason, decisions are independent from the 
relative power of the deliberative parties. In other words, support by the majority 
or a powerful economic group does not determine the outcome in decision 
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processes. In cases of persistent disagreement on a given issue, furthermore, 
deliberation permits mutual understanding and trust and therefore brings the 
opposing parties closer. Therefore, deliberation contributes to moderation.  
 According to Gutmann and Thompson, deliberative democracy offers an 
appealing way to deal with ―deliberative disagreements‖ in politics.17 A 
disagreement is ‗deliberative‘ when two parties holding different beliefs on a 
given subject matter recognize each other‘s view as bearing moral worth and thus 
as deserving respect.
18
 The paradigmatic example of a deliberative disagreement 
is the debate over liberalization of abortion. Gutmann and Thompson refer to it as 
a case in which both parties argue from ―different plausible premises to 
fundamentally conflicting public policies.‖ Such disagreements are not due to the 
parties‘ epistemic flaws, but rather to a diversity of circumstances leading them to 
reach opposing conclusions.
19
 Gutmann and Thompson identify the existence of 
incompatible moral values (i.e., the value of liberty and the value of life) as the 
sources of disagreement in the abortion controversy.
20
 
Pro-life advocates, they point out, base their opposition to legalization of 
abortion on a defense of the right to life that all innocent humans enjoy. They 
claim that fetuses are human beings and appeal to ―established scientific facts‖ 
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about the gradual development of a fertilized egg into a viable fetus with the 
biological characteristics of a human being. On the other hand, Pro-choice groups 
base their support to legalization of abortion on a defense of women‘s freedom of 
choice over their own bodies.
21
 They claim that fetuses are only potential human 
beings and therefore the state has no duty to protect them. So stated, Gutmann and 
Thompson continue, neither position can be considered as unreasonable or blamed 
to be appealing to arguments that radically disregard the requirements of 
legitimacy applying within liberal democracies.
22
 
Instead of appealing to majority rule, Gutmann and Thompson propose 
that deliberative disagreements must be solved through deliberation and, if 
disagreements persist, through compromises. In cases of ineludible conflict the 
best alternative is to find a middle ground that could be recognized by the parties 
to the disagreement. The parties must find an alternative view that requires neither 
of them to abandon the fundamental principles illuminating their initial views. 
After compromise, the parties still consider their own position as the ‗right‘ one 
and the opposing one as the ‗wrong‘ one, but they agree to disagree. Faced with 
such situations, the parties have a moral duty ―to try to accommodate the moral 
convictions of their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without 
compromising their own moral convictions.‖  Since it reduces the number of 
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disagreements in politics, this strategy to solve deliberative disagreements is 
called the ―economy of moral disagreement.‖23 
The strength of the requirement of deliberation lies in the acknowledgment 
of a moral duty of mutual respect among individuals of a society. If one party to a 
disagreement decided to impose her view, she would be failing in recognizing the 
views of her fellow citizens and therefore in showing them respect. A truly 
democratic rule requires citizens‘ participation in society‘s policy making, and 
respecting each other‘s views appears to be a minimal criterion for respectful and 
democratic rule. The reason-giving requirement is, according to Gutmann and 
Thompson, the best way to guarantee that citizens are treated as ―autonomous 
agents who take part in the governance of their own society.‖24 Therefore, by 
appealing to a moral requirement of public justification and further moral 
compromises, deliberative democrats intend to guarantee that the ideal of 
democratic rule is achieved by means of assuring that political power is an 
expression of the people‘s power rather than the power of a faction or a sect. This 
is an important characteristic of deliberative democracy, for it also intends to 
guarantee that fundamentalist conceptions of the world—particularly in morally 
charged topics—end up by moderating themselves as their holders find 
themselves engaged in a mutually binding process of deliberation.  
Alongside Gutmann and Thompson, Stephen Macedo emphasizes the 
moderation enhancing properties of deliberative democracy. Macedo recognizes 
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that the debate over abortion leads to a case of deliberative disagreement—
following Ralws, he calls it ―reasonable disagreement‖—and argues that 
compromises must be made. Against Ronald Dworkin, he claims that there are 
cases where ―the best argument‖ cannot be achieved and thus that the parties 
should seek a compromise.
25
 Once the parties recognize mutual reasonableness, 
Macedo says, they must display the virtues of magnanimity and moderation and 
find out an alternative view that recognizes some aspects of both positions. In 
such cases, the parties must adopt a self-critical attitude and recognize that not all 
―reasoned considerations‖ are on their side.26  
 One objection this version of deliberative democracy has faced is that it 
overlooks the fact that politics is ultimately a display of power, which implies that 
political decision making processes are determined by power relations.
27
 If 
deliberation plays any relevant role in decision making processes, the objection 
says, it is only to mask prejudices, pre-established opinions, and subjective 
preferences about a certain subject matter.
28
 In other words, by misrepresenting 
the nature of politics, deliberative democracy is vulnerable to the same critics it 
has raised to aggregative conceptions of democracy.
29
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A good example illustrating the close connection between politics and 
power and the way the latter excludes any possibility for meaningful moral 
deliberation is the health care debate in the United States. Gutmann and 
Thompson are aware of this and consequently devote great attention to address 
it.
30
 They recognize the importance power inequalities play in the way the issue is 
discussed and in the outcomes that it has produced so far. In this context, power 
misbalances are evidenced by the decisive influence rich citizens and insurance 
companies exercise in framing decisions that are blatantly unjust as they neglect 
basic health care attention to the poor. A characteristic in the health-care debate as 
it is carried out today is that the expectations of the least-advantaged are 
constrained by their relative power faced to actual injustices. Gutmann and 
Thompson call this situation the ―burdens of injustice.‖ Poor citizens, and their 
representatives, can have only a low expectation given their lack of bargaining 
power.  
In this debate, current conditions for deliberation do not satisfy the basic 
requirements to undertake a fair and informative debate. Neither do they produce 
health-care regulations that seek social justice promotion rather than the interests 
of profit based insurance companies. Background conditions for deliberation, 
thus, play a fundamental role in defining whether deliberation leads to outcomes 
for the right reasons or not. The parties‘ level of competence and information, 
their distribution of resources, and their open mindedness constitute key 
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determining elements of the quality of the deliberation and therefore of the quality 
of a democracy.
31
   
Given that the abortion debate constitutes a case of deliberative 
disagreement, compromises leading to a decision should not be considered as 
outcomes of bargain strategies or power relations. The powerful side, if there is 
one, should not force the disadvantaged one to accept its view. The decision 
should not be determined by the power or number of adherents a view initially 
holds, but should be an outcome of moral deliberation and further mutually 
respectful compromise  
3. A comparative analysis of deliberative democracy and moderation 
The case of abortion, however, shows that deliberative disagreements are not 
immune to power biases and thereby to benefit the powerful side. To illustrate this 
point, compare the United States‘ and Colombian processes of decriminalization 
of abortion.  
As of 1973, abortion was outlawed in most states of the U.S. except for 
cases in which the mother‘s life was threatened.  Roe v. Wade challenged the 
constitutionality of Texas‘ criminal law, which abridged women‘s right to 
privacy.
32
 The Supreme Court decided on Roe‘s behalf and with its decision it 
obliged modifications in criminal codes nationwide.  
Gutmann and Thompson consider that Roe is an example of successful 
compromise. The Court, they say, decided the issue on the grounds that it 
intended to acknowledge to the farthest extend possible both views in conflict. 
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Although the Court did not endorse the view that fetuses are persons, it 
recognized that protection of potential human life was a fundamental state 
interest. Pro-Life advocates are usually against any sort of practice of abortion. 
One of their most recurrent arguments appeals to their concerns about killing 
potential human beings. For this reason, Gutmann and Thompson consider that 
the Court‘s acknowledgment of such protection as a state interest constitutes 
recognition of the Pro-Life view. Prohibition of abortion in the third trimester is 
grounded under this rationale, and therefore allows for future restrictions if 
medical technology provides evidence about an extension on the viability of 
human life to earlier stages of pregnancy.
33
 The decision to allow abortions is 
constrained by our knowledge about viability of human life.  
The rationale offered to justify the right to ban abortion during the second 
trimester is different and, as Gutmann and Thompson show, problematic. It 
appeals to a paternalistic principle according to which the state has a duty to 
protect the mother‘s life even against her will, which is a rationale neither Pro-
Life nor Pro-Choice advocates claim. The Court considered second-trimester 
abortions riskier than normal childbirth, hence the ban. This rationale is 
problematic because it does not offer a proper justification as to why the mother‘s 
health should be protected instead of potential life. Furthermore, it is not clear 
what the requirement would be if in the future viability of human life extends to 
the second trimester; should states be permitted to regulate abortions, as in third 
trimester cases? By adopting a paternalistic principle, the Court encouraged states 
to develop ―dubious medical rationales to justify their restrictions on abortion‖ 
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and to try to show how such rationales ―would protect maternal health even when 
their actual purpose was to protect prenatal life.‖34 Instead of keeping the initial 
rationale of protecting potential human life for settling the issue in second 
trimester abortions, and thereby respecting both views in conflict, the Court has 
opened the floor to more divisiveness and less possibilities for future changes 
trough rational deliberation.  
 On the other hand, until 2006, Colombian legislation outlawed abortion 
under all circumstances. In 2005, Women’s Link International, an international 
human rights non-profit organization, challenged the constitutionality of such 
legislation. Although it was not the first time such challenge was raised, it was the 
first time that it was grounded on international human rights arguments.
35
 The 
core of the argument appealed to the fact that Colombian Constitution explicitly 
states that international human rights treaties ratified by the congress prevail over 
national laws and serve as a guide in interpreting rights established by the 
Constitution.
36
 Outlawing abortion, it was argued, was incompatible with several 
international treaties signed by Colombia and disregarded several 
recommendations made to Colombia by international human rights organizations. 
In May 2006, the Constitutional Court accepted the claim of unconstitutionality 
and decriminalized abortion in three exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, it 
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ruled that women and girls have the right to receive opportune and accurate 
information about their alternatives were they in a condition for opting to have an 
abortion.
37
 
The way in which the abortion issue has been resolved in Colombia 
requires a different perspective than the one presented for the U.S.‘s case, for it is 
not clear which view has been accommodated and where compromises and 
accommodations lie. On the one side, Pro-Life advocates might have been led to 
compromise and to accept that banning abortion in all cases was oppressive; on 
the other side, Pro-Choice advocates had to lower down their expectations and 
aimed to liberalize abortion only for therapeutic reasons. Since the status quo was 
utterly on the Pro-Life side, any modification to the law can be taken as an 
accommodation of Pro-Choice concerns and as a compromise of the Pro-Life 
initial view.  
Pro-Choice advocates‘ main arguments for partial liberalization of 
abortion appealed to the cruelness of the complete ban on abortion, for it entailed 
a great deal of sufferance—if not death—on the mother‘s side. This basic 
rationale, which evokes some sort of Milliam harm principle, was meant to 
override Pro-Life arguments in favor of a conception of human life as starting at 
conception. The strength of the argument relied on an attempt to reduce 
unnecessary pain on the mothers‘ side.  Since all three cases that were demanded 
for decriminalization represent very extreme situations for the mother, it was 
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repeatedly argued that obliging women to carry on their pregnancies was cruel. 
When in 2006 the Supreme Court decided to decriminalize abortion in the 
mentioned three cases, Pro-Choice supporters were more than satisfied. In 
contrast, Pro-Life supporters, led by the Catholic Church, protested. In Colombia 
abortion is still penalized and most pregnancies are illegible for abortions. 
However, according to the deliberative democracy model, current legislation 
constitutes an example of successful compromise between the parties that were 
initially positioned in a deliberative disagreement. 
This comparison leaves us in a situation in which we have to accept two 
radically different policies on abortion as successful outcomes of moral 
compromises and therefore as legitimate. They are radically different policies 
because that very legislation which is taken as a liberalization of abortion in 
Colombia, is considered to be an uncompromising legislation failing to concede 
enough reason to Pro-Choice advocates in the U.S (and indeed in most western 
European democracies). In other words, what in Colombia might be interpreted as 
a successful example of deliberative democracy promoting moderation, in the 
U.S. represents the uncompromised and non-moderate Pro-Life position. 
4. On Fundamentalism and Reasonableness 
As a response, someone might argue that Colombian legislation reflects an 
unreasonable approach towards abortion and therefore it cannot be taken as a case 
of principled moral compromise in which both views are fairly accommodated. 
The underlying idea is that Pro-Life supporters must, at least, concede that during 
43 
 
the first stage of pregnancy abortion can hardly constitute a murder of an innocent 
life and therefore that it should not rise such high degree of outcry. 
 According to deliberative democrats, deliberation has to take place under 
specific circumstances. The parties must be competent enough to deliberate about 
the issue at stake, which means that they must, at least, have adequate 
information. Additionally, they must show some degree of open mindedness, 
which means that deliberators must be open to take a minimal range of arguments 
seriously.
38
 Therefore, if these background conditions are adequate, 
fundamentalist Pro-Lifers are expected to moderate and reformulate their view 
after sincere deliberation, so as to turn their unreasonable beliefs about abortion 
into reasonable (Pro-Life) ones.
39
  
 Furthermore, someone assessing political values such as due respect for 
human life, ordered reproduction of the political society over time, and equality of 
women, will eventually come up with the conclusion that abortion should be 
liberalized at least during the first trimester of pregnancy.
40
 A liberalization of this 
kind might embrace compromises. For instance, it might include an acceptance of 
legislative regulations discouraging women‘s intention to abort, such as the 
controversial Texas legislation (2013) which requires abortion clinics to meet the 
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same standards of ambulatory surgery centers.
41
 The important conclusion to be 
drawn is that a reasoned stand on the issue would lead to accept some degree of 
liberalization. A reasonable Pro-Life supporter must accept that in some cases 
abortion is permissible, or at least not a terrible act of murder. 
However, according to the epistemic approach to reasonable 
disagreements and political liberalism, Pro-Life fundamentalist beliefs are not 
necessarily unreasonable. Fabienne Peter has explained political divisiveness in 
terms of reasonable disagreements. According to her, if there is a reason to take 
pluralism seriously, it is because of the existence of reasonable disagreements.
42
 
The latter must be understood as conflicts ―between beliefs that the parties to the 
disagreement are each justified to hold.‖43 According to Peter, the parties to a 
public controversy usually cannot account for the first-order evidence they are 
assuming as grounds for the beliefs they hold.
44
 Thus, Pro-Life supporters might 
not be able to account for the evidence grounding their conviction against the 
moral permissibility of abortion. Such evidence might have been transmitted in 
form of a religious experience that the parties cannot account for. Since ‗ought 
implies can,‘ deliberative democracy should not expect individuals to be able to 
account for their beliefs and to publicly scrutinize them.  
                                                 
41
 For an account of the debate Texas‘ legislation, see ―Texas Abortion Clinic to Reopen After 
Ruling,‖ accessed November 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/us/texas-abortion-
clinic-to-reopen-after-court-ruling.html?_r=0. 
42
 Peter, ―Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism.‖ Waldron‘s political philosophy also 
emphasizes on disagreement, see Waldron, Law and Disagreement. Charles Larmore argues that 
the real challenge liberal political theory has to face is disagreement and not pluralism. The 
difference being that the former is the product of epistemic conditions affecting individuals‘ 
judgment and the latter is the irreducibility of the moral world—i.e., Berlin‘s value pluralism, see 
Larmore, The Morals of Modernity. 
43
 Peter, ―Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism,‖ 8. 
44
 First order evidence is the evidence available to a person to justify her beliefs. Epistemic norms 
are the rules indicating whether it is epistemic permissible to hold some belief. 
45 
 
Religious beliefs depend on first-order evidence, which is directly related 
to the beliefs-holder. Such experience is so subtle and complex that the individual 
might not be able to account for it. Furthermore, attempts to share that experience 
trough appeals to religious doctrines cannot fully honor the personal and 
immediate experience leading to religious beliefs. As Peter says, ―something is 
lost in translation.‖45 Non-religious moral beliefs enjoy an analogous nature. Peter 
describes moral doctrines as relying to some extent on intuitions, the origin of 
which we usually cannot explain. Such intuitions are fallible and dependent upon 
a diversity of social factors that shape our moral character in a way we are not 
aware of. 
It is important to highlight that Peter is not analyzing sophisticated 
metaphysical scenarios of reasonable disagreements that can hardly be found in 
contemporary politics. On the contrary, she explicitly mentions that her focus is 
on disagreements about fundamental moral and religious truths, such as issues 
―related to salvation or perfection.‖46 Her focus is on the widely discussed conflict 
between secular and religious doctrines in the public sphere. Being the 
paradigmatic case of deliberative disagreement confronting religious-friendly and 
secular-friendly moralities, the abortion controversy with no doubts can be 
included in Peter‘s account of reasonable disagreements in politics.47 
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Peter‘s view about the inaccessibility to one‘s own beliefs is shared by 
political philosophers that have criticized the version of deliberative democracy 
abovementioned, on the grounds of having a secularistic bias. These criticisms to 
the dominant version of contemporary liberalism claim that it imposes unfair 
burdens to religious citizens, for it requires them to refrain from relying on their 
most cherished values because of their intrinsically sectarian nature. The 
requirement is unfair because it assumes that religious reasons are sectarian in a 
way secular ones are not.
48
 The former are paradigmatically considered as 
sectarian given their mystic and revealed nature. However, it is argued, moral 
secular reasons are as obscure and inaccessible as religious ones. 
Kevin Vallier argues that there is an epistemic symmetry between reasons 
deriving from religious testimony and reasons deriving from (secular) moral 
testimony. Thus, an argument that sets its grounding premise on the authority of 
the Bible, for instance, does not have less epistemic value than an argument 
setting its grounding premise on the authority of a secular agent (the family, 
communities, teachers, respected authorities, books).
49
 The reason explaining this 
symmetry is similar to the one provided by Peter. Moral reasoning, Vallier argues, 
usually relies on the testimony of others. In the case of religious moral reasoning, 
it may appeal to the testimony of religious authorities, religious texts, and the 
tradition of their interpretation. Religious-grounded opposition to abortion, for 
instance, can be based on a long lasting theological and philosophical tradition 
determining the existence of God, of the soul, and of the intrinsic worth of human 
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life since the moment of conception. A Catholic citizen may base her 
fundamentalistic beliefs on abortion relying upon the testimony of her local priest, 
who might have attended a seminar where he studied ―serious Catholic 
philosophers, including St. Augustine, St. Anselm and St. Thomas Aquinas.‖ The 
testimony of the local priest is, therefore, reliable because of his knowledge of the 
intellectual and theological tradition of Catholic thought—or because of his 
acquaintance with someone who does. The opinion of the Catholic (Pro-Life) 
citizen is epistemically justified because of the reliability of her sources, including 
her local priest and his knowledge of ―some of the greatest moral philosophers in 
human history.‖ Similarly, secular moral reasoning appeals to the norms that the 
people ―around us already accept.‖50 
From the point of view of the conception of deliberative democracy, these 
are controversial claims.
51
 According to the dominant view of deliberative 
democracy, to which Gutmann and Thompson belong, one has to be able to 
account for her own beliefs. A biblical justification of a coercive law, deliberative 
democrats usually hold, cannot be considered as authoritative because it is not 
publicly accessible and therefore it ―close[s] off any possibility of publicly 
assessing or interpreting‖ their content.52 The ideal of political deliberation 
requires that the parties give reasons that are mutually accessible, that is, that can 
be understood by all citizens to whom they are addressed. It is usually asserted 
that if the content of a reason cannot be understood by the parties to whom they 
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are addressed, then deliberative justification can hardly take place. In essence, this 
is what providing sectarian reasons means. To appeal to the authority of 
revelation, therefore, cannot be acceptable because such authorities are not 
recognized by all evaluative standards. By requiring citizens to scrutinize their 
beliefs and public opinions, public deliberation intends to reduce levels of 
dogmatism in the conflicting views and thereby to increase the likeness of 
rapprochement of the parties. By not being able to account for their own beliefs, 
the parties might not be suitable to carry out deliberations in which mutual 
understanding is achieved.  
Peter‘s and Vallier‘s approaches suggest that even if the parties to a 
disagreement cannot account for their own beliefs, they can be epistemically 
justified in holding to them. Therefore they are entitled to provide religious-based 
reasons for both advancing their political claims and defeating state‘s 
interference.
53
 Yet Peter and Vallier are not favorable to fundamentalist views in 
public deliberations. Once the parties realize that they are on a reasonable 
disagreement they have an epistemic duty to compromise their view. On Peter‘s 
account, compromises acquire normative force by the parties‘ commitment to 
rationality. Therefore the acknowledgment of reasonableness to fundamentalist 
religious beliefs does not put at risk core liberal principles endorsed by the state. 
Acknowledging reasonableness to fundamentalist beliefs in the debate over 
liberalization of abortion does not entail that moderation will not come up after 
deliberation.  
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One consequence of Peter‘s approach is that fundamentalist Pro-Life and 
Pro-Choice views are equally reasonable. Furthermore, they can be presented as 
sophisticated arguments that respect criteria of reciprocity and public reason.
54
 
Individuals to a disagreement can be justified in holding their beliefs even if these 
are extreme. This does not imply, however, that individuals are justified to remain 
attached to their views when they face a disagreement that they cannot 
overcome.
55
 Nor are they required to discard their initial view. According to Peter, 
they are required to restrain from imposing their respective positions and thus to 
tolerate each other. Awareness about the persistence of disagreements despite 
thoughtful deliberation leaves the parties in a position in which they can only 
know that at least one of the views to the disagreement is wrong, yet they do not 
know which one. The parties must adopt a reasonable attitude, that is, they have to 
behave in such a way as to be ready to make a decision that can partially satisfy 
the expectations of all the parties. In other words, they must accept that the best 
thing to do is to compromise and to agree on a moderate alternative to their initial 
thoughts. 
A move from an unreasonable attitude against any form of abortion—Pro-
Life fundamentalism—to a reasonable one does not constitute a case of principled 
compromise, however. In other words, the transition from a position that opposes 
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to abortion in all cases towards its moderate version, which accepts therapeutic 
abortions only, cannot be considered as a successful case of compromise.  
Arguably, Colombian Pro-Life fundamentalists undertook a deliberative 
process. They listened to new arguments and evidence, and, afterwards, accepted 
to modify their stand as to recognize therapeutic abortions.
56
 However, they did 
not compromise their view since all they did was to accept the disproportionality 
of the harm they were permitting by utterly banning abortion. A fundamentalist 
Pro-Life supporter does not have to change any core belief once a decision must 
be made between accepting the death of the unborn or of the mother. Similar 
reasoning can be followed in the other two cases of therapeutic abortion.
57
 After 
all, it is about cases in which what is at stake is reducing or avoiding extreme 
harm to the mother—in cases of rape and serious health problems—or to the 
future child—in cases of malformations or serious diseases that will make the 
child‘s life too harmful and brief.58  
It could be said, then, that when the debate is about decriminalizing full 
bans on abortion, deliberative disagreements hardly appear. A fundamentalist Pro-
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Life supporter might have a principled opposition to abortion in whatever case it 
is performed. However, the values she appeals to at the moment of justification of 
her view (i.e., protection of human life) are jeopardized in cases of therapeutic 
abortions. The reasons why the life of an unborn must prevail over the life of a 
dying mother are not clear at all. In this case, Pro-Life fundamentalists have to 
accept the tragedy of losing a human life, and opting to protect mothers‘ lives 
does not seem morally arbitrary. For instance, mothers might have other children 
to take care of and letting them die for the sake of the unborn would only increase 
the tragedy.
59
 If a Pro-Life fundamentalist agrees to accept abortion for 
therapeutic reasons only, then her change of mind would not be a case of 
compromise. She would be accepting cases for abortion that are not incompatible 
with her initial views. Pro-Life fundamentalists are not accepting an alternative to 
their initial position in the debate; instead, they are recognizing that what they 
initially considered to be completely objectionable from their point of view was 
not. 
According to deliberative democracy, the Colombian process of partial 
decriminalization of abortion and its outcome are legitimate because moderation 
was achieved. Moderation in this case is relative. The legislation to be 
transformed (e.g. criminalization of all sorts of abortion) can be described as 
being more radical than the current legislation (e.g. permission of therapeutic 
abortion). Furthermore, the parties displayed some sort of reasonableness and 
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mutual respect—perhaps there was no symmetry in this respect—because they 
were open to modify their views and to agree on an alternative best. Furthermore, 
according to the views supported by Peter and Vallier, an objective evaluation of 
current Colombian legislation on abortion would conclude that it is reasonable, 
for it is possible to achieve it appealing to a reliable, and therefore plausible, 
justification of it. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
According to deliberative democracy, the parties to a deliberative disagreement 
will eventually find a middle ground to overcome their impasse. In other words, 
there is an expectation that, even if the disagreeing parties are too radical, they 
will be motivated—whether morally or epistemically—to agree upon a moderate 
version of their initial view. In an ideally liberal democracy, policies will not 
crystalize neither of the fundamentalist versions to a disagreement.  
 Aggregative conceptions of democracy suggest solving deliberative 
disagreements by majority rule. In the case of abortion, for instance, they would 
prefer to imitate Italy‘s and Uruguay‘s referendums evaluating legislation on 
abortion.
60
 According to deliberative democrats, such decision allows status quo 
structures of power to mobilize and influence the people‘s choice and therefore to 
preserve and reinforce such forces. This is one of the reasons why conservative 
religious associations usually propose referendums in order to ratify abortion 
policies. They expect to be able to mobilize religious sensibilities against 
liberalization of abortion. 
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 For deliberative democrats, deliberation plays a crucial role in guiding 
policy making within a society. In cases in which reasonable disagreements are 
likely to appear, deliberation encourages rapprochement among the parties and 
fosters moderate alternatives. However, I have argued that it is vulnerable to the 
same criticism it raises to aggregative conceptions of democracy. The cases of 
Colombia and the U.S. show that dominant opinions guide the debates and 
therefore status quo distributions of power, rather than moderation, influence the 
final outcome. The explanation to the question why in the U.S. and Colombia 
took different paths has to be found in external factors other than the process of 
deliberation in itself. Arguably, the power of social movements and private 
institutions played a decisive role. If this is the case, the future of abortion might 
be decided according to powerful private associations. This conclusion is of no 
little importance. Pro-Life fundamentalism is gaining terrain in the Americas, 
which is an alert about the possibility of a future in which status quo social 
relationships support regressive policies on abortion, which are already taking 
place.
61
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CHAPTER 2  
On Tolerating Majorities  
In the previous chapter, I developed an argument against deliberative democracy 
and its proposal to address ‗reasonable disagreements‘ through the politics of 
compromise. I argued that such conception is not sensitive enough of power 
inequalities of the parties to a deliberation and therefore that legitimate outcomes 
of deliberative processes might be determined by the parties‘ relative powers. 
Consequently, powerless social groups are vulnerable to be trapped by what Amy 
Gutmman and Dennis Thompson call the ―burdens of injustice.‖1 What are the 
duties of a liberal and democratic state with respect such vulnerable groups? In 
this chapter I develop an understanding of toleration that aims at reducing the 
burdens of injustice by inverting the traditional direction in which relationships of 
liberal toleration are understood. According to this understanding, powerless and 
dominated social groups are supported by the state at the same time that illiberal 
beliefs and practices displayed by the majority are tolerated.  
 
In contemporary debates about toleration there is a salient worry about the proper 
attitude a liberal and democratic state must adopt in relation to an illiberal 
minority. One of the most important questions to be addressed in these debates is 
whether it is legitimate to impose or promote liberal values into ―cultural 
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communities,‖ ―illiberal minorities,‖ or ―traditional communities,‖ in order to 
avoid injustices within such social groups.
2
 This approach to toleration led 
Kymlicka to distinguish between ―internal restrictions‖ and ―external 
protections.‖ This famous distinction intends to protect individuals within cultural 
minorities from oppression by their own culture and to protect minorities from 
detrimental decisions made by the larger community.
3
 Questions about cultural 
accommodations or deterrents to illiberal minorities are prominent in nowadays 
debates on toleration. Liberal toleration is, then, characterized by three features: 
an institutional framework that grants toleration; a liberal majoritarian society that 
acknowledges toleration; and an illiberal minority group that is tolerated.   
 In this chapter I will address a different question, for I will not accept 
features two and three abovementioned. I will argue that the second assumption 
does not always—indeed, usually doesn‘t—correspond to reality and that so-
called liberal societies are usually intolerant towards minority social groups that 
are not necessarily illiberal. Hence, I am interested in investigating the proper 
stand a liberal state should take towards illiberal beliefs and practices when these 
are exercised by a majority that displays an intolerant attitude towards liberal 
minoritarian social groups. Instead of discussing about the legitimacy of the right 
that allows the Amish community to withdraw their children from high school 
because, as they claim, higher education is incompatible with their religious and 
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cultural beliefs and practices,
4
 I investigate whether the predominant beliefs 
against homosexuality held by the majority or by powerful institutions can be 
object of toleration.  
This is a different approach to the tolerance question, for it challenges the 
standard understanding of toleration and the way the issue about same-sex 
marriage is addressed. To begin with, it raises the possibility of changing the 
traditional understanding of the power relationships involved in toleration, 
according to which it is a powerful majority who tolerates a powerless minority. 
Secondly, it challenges the suggestion that same-sex marriage constitutes a case in 
which the virtue of toleration must be displayed. I argue that liberal states must; 
first, tolerate illiberal beliefs and practices; second, publicly express that the 
majority‘s illiberal beliefs and practices are object of toleration; and third, 
discourage them. 
1. Concept and conceptions of toleration  
In order to develop a clear approach to the debate over toleration it is useful to 
follow Rainer Forst‘s understanding. He follows Rawls‘ proposal of identifying a 
concept of justice and different conceptions of justice.
5
 Hence, Forst recognizes 
the elements that constitute the central semantic contents of the concept of 
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toleration and different specific interpretations of such elements that constitute the 
four main conceptions of toleration.  
The first element that a concept of toleration specifies is ‗the context of 
toleration,‘ which identifies the agents involved in the relationship of toleration; 
who are they? What is tolerated? And what are the actions that the act of 
toleration entails? Forst‘s focus is mainly on political relations involving 
governments and citizens that belong to a society in which cultural and religious 
pluralism is pervasive.  
The second element common to all conceptions of toleration is the ‗objection 
component.‘ An act of toleration is an act that involves the rejection of some 
practices or beliefs because they are considered as ―bad in a substantive normative 
sense.‖6 This component determines the difference between toleration and 
relationships of indifference and acceptance. The former is a relationship in which 
there is no judgment in favor or against the other, the latter involves a positive 
judgment. The objection component is not an objection out of prejudice or hatred, 
but rather an objection grounded on inter-subjectively defensible reasons derived 
from specific ethical beliefs systems. Therefore, it has to place itself above a 
minimal moral threshold.  
 The objection component is accompanied by an ‗acceptance component.‘ 
Tolerated convictions and practices are not considered to be as deeply false or 
wrong as to deny them the status of being tolerated. The reasons supporting the 
acceptance of such convictions and practices must not override the reasons 
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leading to object such beliefs and practices. Otherwise there will not be a case for 
toleration.  
The concept of toleration necessitates the specification of the limits of 
toleration. Neglecting these limits might lead to the self-destruction of toleration 
itself, for it may imply attitudes in which everything is tolerated and therefore 
may be extended to the ―enemies of toleration.‖7 Setting the limits of toleration 
introduces a third component of the concept of toleration, namely, the ‗rejection 
component.‘ It is constituted by reasons to reject practices or beliefs that override 
the reasons for acceptance.  
 Toleration must be also exercised “of one’s own free will,” which means 
that the tolerating party must be free to act accordingly to its objection to some 
beliefs and practices. However, Forst claims that this does not mean that a 
constitutive element of toleration is that the tolerating agent ―must be in a position 
of power from which it could effectively prevent the practices in question.‖8 
Powerless minorities can adopt a tolerant attitude and consider that they would 
not use their power were they in a position to exercise their objection.  
 Finally, the concept of toleration can signify both a ‗practice‘ and an 
‗individual attitude.‘ The former refers to the ―political-structural‖ level related to 
the government while the latter refers to the individual attitudes citizens might 
adopt in a given society.  
As mentioned above, the conceptions of toleration are different 
interpretations of the core elements of the concept of toleration. Forst identifies 
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four distinctive conceptions, namely, the ‗permission conception,‘ the 
‗coexistence conception,‘ the ‗respect conception,‘ and the ‗esteem conception.‘ 
The permission conception establishes a relation between a powerful majority and 
dissenting minorities. This is a relation of domination of the former over the latter, 
for the dominant majority establishes the terms under which it is in disposition to 
concede permission to the minorities to live according to their traditions and 
beliefs. Usually, such conditions refer to limitations to certain liberties. For 
instance, minorities might be granted some autonomy within a territory but might 
be excluded from political decision making processes. Usually, minorities are not 
allowed to seek equal political status, which implies that a ‗vertical‘ relationship 
of hierarchy is clearly in place. The majority tolerates the minority and the 
minority accepts, or is compelled to accept, its status of inferiority. Forst points 
out that this is the notion of toleration that Goethe had in mind when he famously 
opposed to toleration in the following terms: ―Tolerance should be a temporary 
attitude only: it must lead to recognition. To tolerate means to insult.‖9 
 According to the coexistence conception of toleration, the agents in the 
relationship of toleration are not in majority-minority or powerful-powerless 
relationships. They are roughly equally powerful and therefore they understand 
that the best way to guarantee peaceful coexistence is to tolerate each other. The 
relationship of toleration in this case is not vertical—as in the case of the 
permission conception—but horizontal, for both agents are at the same time 
tolerated and tolerating. This is the version of toleration Rawls describes in his 
narration about the historical origins of the liberal notion of toleration, which he 
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identifies in the end of the European Wars of Religion that led to a modus vivendi 
among the diverse Christian religious denominations.
10
 One characteristic of this 
conception of toleration is that the stability reached is weak because it depends 
upon the relative strength of the parties. If one of them suddenly finds itself in a 
more powerful position, it will certainly alter the terms of toleration in its favor.  
 The third conception of toleration, the respect conception, introduces a 
moral component to the relation of toleration. The former two conceptions were 
defined in terms of the capacity to dominate the other. According to the respect 
conception, the parties recognize each other ―as moral-political equals.‖ This 
means that both acknowledge a duty to be guided by norms they can mutually 
accept on equal grounds. The agents are not required to regard each other‘s 
worldviews as equally good or valuable, but as the outcome of autonomous 
choices (or at least as not being absolutely immoral.) Accordingly, each person is 
respected and each person‘s choices are tolerated.11 Forst identifies two models of 
this conception: the ‗formal equality conception‘ and the ‗qualitative equality 
conception.‘ 
 The ‗formal equality model‘ of the respect conception of toleration 
establishes a strict distinction between the political and the private realms. 
Conflicts in the political realm are avoided given the requirement to keep cultural 
and religious differences—what Forst calls ―ethical differences‖— within the 
private realm. French contemporary model of laïcité is associated with this model 
of the respect conception of tolerance, for it holds that ‗conspicuous religious 
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symbols‘ (e.g. Muslim headscarves) must remain in the private realm in order to 
guarantee a conflict-free public sphere. Keeping differences within the private 
sphere guarantees avoiding conflicts in the public sphere.
12
 
 The ‗qualitative equality model‘ of the respect conception of toleration 
recognizes the pitfalls of the formal equality model and advances a more 
accommodating attitude toward cultural and religious differences. It recognizes 
that the formal equality model favors some religious and cultural groups for 
whom it is natural to live according to the requirements of privatization of 
sectarian aspects of their cultural or religious memberships. The qualitative 
equality model weakens the requirement of privatization for those individuals that 
can provide good reasons for accommodation. Contemporary liberals usually 
adopt this version of the respect conception of toleration in light of its flexibility 
to accommodate minoritarian, both liberal and illiberal, worldviews.   
 The fourth conception of toleration, the esteem conception, is the most 
demanding of all and it emerges in debates about the relations between 
multiculturalism and toleration. It does not require respect of cultural or religious 
differences only. It requires for such differences to be appreciated as valuable 
conceptions that can be held by valid and good reasons. It is a conception of 
toleration because it establishes a relation in which one party finds the other party 
attractive but not attractive enough as to fully embrace it. Forst describes the 
esteem relation in this conception as esteem ―with reservations.‖ Contemporary 
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versions of ―value pluralism‖ can be associated with this conception of toleration, 
for they hold ―the existence of intrinsically worthwhile yet incompatible forms of 
life.‖13 Some versions of communitarian political theories are also using this 
conception of toleration when they claim that there are shared notions of the good 
life with variations that can be tolerated.
14
 
2. Liberal toleration and recognition 
Liberalism is a political doctrine that endorses toleration as a fundamental 
practice. It is commonly said that the Protestant Reformation and the subsequent 
European Wars of Religion are foundational in the birth of liberalism. These early 
developments of the liberal conception of toleration are characterized by the 
acceptance of church and state separation as a mean to guarantee coexistence of 
several religions in a single political community.  
This idea, as pointed out above, is suggested by the distinction between 
the public and private spheres. The underlying idea is that religion is beyond the 
coercive power of the state because it is a matter of conscience, which cannot be 
transformed by coercive means but only by persuasion. Religious beliefs, and in 
general issues of conscience, are relegated to the private sphere and individuals 
are granted the freedom to determine those issues according to their own lights.  
 Granted the separation of spheres, the principle of state neutrality becomes 
necessary.
15
 The commitment to equality that is at the base of liberalism and the 
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acknowledgment of the possibility for religious freedom leads to the conformation 
of a principle that requires that all religions should be treated on equal grounds. 
Granting privileges to one religion over the others would create an inconsistent 
practice of the separation of spheres, for it would constitute an intervention in 
matters that are of no concern of the state. The principle of neutrality requires that 
the state refrains from embracing any religion in detriment of the others. In its 
most common form, it requires that state power be justified by appealing to 
reasons that are not derived or necessitated by a specific religious doctrine. In 
other words, the state sets ―aside or ‗bracket‘ controversial moral and religious 
conceptions for purposes of justice.‖16  
This traditional view of liberal toleration, however, faces challenges when 
it has to deal with the growing pluralism that characterizes contemporary 
societies. The diversification of immigration, the emergence of moral non-
religious worldviews, and the vindication of cultural-based claims have 
highlighted the difficulties liberal conceptions of tolerance face.  
 The difficulties of toleration are particularly stringent when the distinction 
between the public and the private spheres are at stake. As Galeotti argues, 
toleration meets its limits as soon as the normalized public-private divide is 
challenged. In these cases, status quo power relationships are shaken by the 
minorities‘ reluctance to respect requirements of privatization of their identities. 
Toleration, Galeotti says, is a devise that addresses conflicts between the majority 
and minority groups within a given society. Such conflicts are generated by the 
majority‘s negative perception of minorities‘ ―traits, habits, and practices.‖ 
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Accordingly, minorities are invisibilized, marginalized, or oppressed as a result of 
such negative perception.
17
  
Politically relevant cases of toleration, Galeotti argues, appear when 
powerless groups stand up and press forward claims of recognition by the larger 
society. These claims obligate the majority to tolerate what they prima facie 
dislike, that is, the majority has to publicly recognize as ―normal‖ the traits, 
habits, and practices of the invisibilized, marginalized, and oppressed minorities. 
Since it is the majority who orchestrates what the state does, toleration is an act by 
the majority motivated by the minorities‘ refusal to ―keep their differences quietly 
within the private sphere‖ and instead displaying them in the public sphere. 
Toleration is required when minorities decide to disrupt the normality and to 
break ―institutional practices and customary habits.‖ An act of toleration consists 
in public recognition of non-normal traits, habits, and practices; and seeks their 
full recognition by the larger society.
18
   
For Galetotti, an act of tolerance must satisfy two conditions. First, it has 
to be performed by a majority and, second, such majority has to be more powerful 
than the minority. In a more just world, Galeotti seems to claim, the question of 
tolerance of Muslim immigrants or same-sex marriage would not arise, for they 
would be fully recognized. Toleration is a first step in a process of recognition of 
differences. Nussbaum‘s defense of the United States‘ tradition of freedom of 
religion points to a similar direction. In her view, societies usually reject what is 
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alien to them and, furthermore, express their rejection by ‗hipersexualizing‘ social 
groups. Examples of such behavior are nineteenth century anti-Catholic and anti-
Mormon sentiments, which were expressed through overemphasizing their 
deviant sexual practices, usually on the grounds of mere prejudice. The story is 
similar with contemporary anti-gay movements.
19
 Nussbaum argues that the U.S‘s 
tradition of freedom of conscience and its openness to accommodate diversity 
helps out in transforming the initial negative perception of what is new into a 
positive (or indifferent) one. This account is similar to Galeotti‘s because both 
hope that the receptive society, or what Galeotti refers to as ‗the majority,‘ 
transforms its initial negative attitude towards the alien or the minority.  
Galeotti‘s own conception of toleration is closer to the esteem conception 
than to the respect one. She keeps the public-private distinction, but attributes to it 
a more liberating characteristic. Toleration is not conceived as an act of non-
interference of private issues as long as they remain private, but as an act of 
state‘s public recognition of identity traces that have thus far been kept in the 
private sphere. The power of toleration, and perhaps this is where the strength of 
Galeotti‘s proposal lies, consists in the fact that by admitting different behaviors 
in the public sphere—same sex marriage or headscarves in public schools—the 
state ―affirms the legitimacy of that behavior and of the corresponding identity in 
the public domain.‖20 By publicly recognizing difference, the state moves forward 
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in removing social norms and their related legal expressions that constitute forms 
of injustice.
21
 
 Galeotti insists on the importance of state‘s responsibility to recognize the 
claims raised by minorities.
22
 Liberal notions of toleration, Galeotti argues, raise  
weak requirements to the state in the enterprise of addressing systematic injustice 
perpetuated by the majority‘s culture, prejudices, or fears. Controversies about the 
Islamic veil or about same-sex marriage illustrate the terms and conditions upon 
which liberal toleration operates. Toleration is granted as long as what is tolerated 
remains in the private sphere.
23
 Muslim women can wear headscarves in their 
private lives, but conflicts arise once they enter into the public sphere (e.g. public 
schools). The situation is similar for homosexuals, for they will stand as equals in 
society as long as they keep their sexual identity in the private sphere. Legal and 
social restrictions emerge as soon as they reveal their sexual identity.  
 For Galeotti, toleration requires recognition of full equality of oppressed 
minorities and it represents a mark of state‘s virtue. Toleration reflects state‘s 
commitment to fight against consequences of long-term historical intolerance. 
This is the importance of Galeotti‘s approach, for it locates the force of toleration 
in a place liberal theorists do not usually consider of major relevance. What is 
compelling in toleration as recognition is that there is a duty to recognize the fact 
of public intolerance against oppressed minorities. This sort of toleration reveals a 
degree of immoral character that should not be endorsed by the state, for it is 
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recognizing a reproachable attitude by the majority that needs to be corrected.
24
 
However, acknowledging public intolerance on the side of the majority of a 
society constitutes a morally relevant act in so far as it rules out debates that risk 
perpetuating marginalization and oppression of minorities. As a political project 
against injustice, this is an appealing idea, for contemporary liberal theory seems 
to be more concerned about problems that do not openly address issues of 
oppression and marginalization.  
In Galeotti‘s account of toleration, as it is common in most practices of 
toleration, there is a temporary acceptance of injustice, for transformations of the 
majority‘s perception of the minority‘s traits, habits, and practices will not be 
immediate. During the period in which same-sex marriage is tolerated, there is at 
place a component of injustice, for the state would be reluctantly permitting such 
extension in the attribution of marriage rights. Although this approach constitutes 
an advantage over the deliberative democracy‘s notion of toleration, it still falls 
short in capturing the power of toleration for contemporary societies.    
Consider for a moment the Catholic Church‘s stand toward 
homosexuality.  The Catholic Church holds a negative view regarding 
homosexuals, yet explicitly calls for attitudes of respect and non-discrimination. 
There is neither persecution nor marginalization. On the contrary, motivated by 
Catholic values such as charity and love for humanity, the attitude towards 
homosexuals is of benevolence and compassion. As Pope Francis I recently 
manifested, homosexuals are in need of assistance, benevolence, and palliative 
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care.
25
 The attitude adopted is not of indifference since the Church is worried 
about homosexuals; neither is it of tolerance, for despite its rejection of 
homosexual caring and sexual practices, lifestyles, and attitudes, the Church has 
not embraced an ―acceptance attitude.‖26 According to the Catholic Church, the 
world would be a better place if nobody were homosexual. Furthermore, it 
considers that there are means to encourage a pacific and gentle path towards such 
ideal. In a display of benevolence and assistance values, the Catholic Church 
welcomes homosexuals and helps them to find the path towards virtue.
27
 
According to Galeotti, the aim of toleration is to promote equal citizenship 
to excluded members of society and, in the long term, to normalize their status as 
equal citizens. Symbolic forms of inclusion are manifestations of such pursuit of 
equality. They are important because they publicly communicate the state‘s active 
commitment to protection of all members of society on equal grounds. Galeotti 
considers this active commitment on the side of the state to be an act of virtuous 
toleration because it represents a step forward in full social and legal recognition. 
She is right in considering that state‘s public commitment in favor of 
discriminated groups contributes to the promotion of social respect towards them. 
This is particularly important in cases in which discrimination has led to 
invisibility and stereotyping of these social groups.  
It is commonly argued that liberal and democratic states must provide the 
institutional means for pluralism to thrive. In some cases, such requirement 
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consists of accepting beliefs, practices, and public expressions that contradict the 
foundational values of a liberal and democratic state. In other words, sometimes 
the state has to tolerate illiberal and undemocratic attitudes. Perhaps the clearest 
example of commitment to pluralism is found in the case of toleration of neo-Nazi 
organizations. The question in this case is whether the state should ban or tolerate 
them. Different considerations might influence such a debate; for instance, 
considerations of respect to the victims of the holocaust might suggest opting for 
the ban, while pragmatic considerations about the  potential danger of clandestine 
neo-Nazi groups might suggest opting for toleration. In either case, what is at 
stake is whether or not an undesirable organization must be tolerated.  
Galeotti‘s conception of toleration does not parallel this traditional 
conception of toleration. As I have showed, she argues that the state must tolerate 
homosexuals and Muslim minorities. She does not claim that what is tolerated in 
these cases is something objectively undesirable. Instead, she argues that the 
larger society must tolerate what it considers to be undesirable. The act of 
toleration would end the moment the larger society recognizes what initially was 
merely tolerated. Toleration, she argues, is a first step toward recognition. 
This conception of toleration poses an important problem, however. 
Galeotti seems to assume a direct relation between the larger society (e.g., the 
majority) and the control over the institutions of the state. Thus, when she argues 
that the larger society must tolerate homosexuals and Muslim minorities, she 
seems to assume that it is the state controlled by such majorities that has to 
perform such toleration. This assumption brings a moral difficulty to Galeotti‘s 
conception of toleration. State action is usually the exercise of coercive power. 
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Depending of the justification provided for the latter, it can be either 
oppressive/authoritarian or legitimate. One necessary condition for state power to 
be legitimate is that it is exercised in such a way that it treats all citizens with 
equal respect.  
Toleration, as described by Galeotti, is a case in which the state does not 
treat all citizens with equal respect, for homosexuals and Muslim minorities are 
accepted as equal citizens only reluctantly. They are, in other words, second-class 
citizens, for state‘s reluctance shows its disapproval of these groups. The question 
to be addressed in this context is whether there is any valid moral justification for 
such treatment. It seems there are none. Galeotti herself considers that the act of 
toleration is an act according to which the larger society is required to carry out a 
process of moral learning which leads  to recognition of what has hitherto 
considered as alien. It seems that what underlies Galeotti‘s justification for 
toleration in these terms are not moral reasons but a mere relinquishment to 
established social norms. Therefore, homosexuals and the Muslim minority must 
accept their condition of being tolerated only because the larger society is not 
accustomed  to their public appearance. In Galeotti‘s approach, social norms 
leading to marginalization and discrimination of some social groups justify their 
treatment by the state as second-class citizens.  
Although Galeotti‘s conception of toleration rightly  requires recognition 
on equal grounds of social groups that are marginalized and oppressed, she 
appeals to the wrong normative concept. According to her, the tolerant agent 
embarks on a process of moral learning that will lead her to full recognition of 
what was initially tolerated. Performed by individuals, this might be a virtuous 
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practice by which someone embarks herself into the process of changing her mind 
about someone else and afterwards recognizing and accepting her with no 
reluctance. The problem appears when the agent is not an individual but the state, 
for it legitimizes—temporarily—the categorization of powerless social groups as 
―second class citizens.‖   
3. Toleration and majority-minority relationships  
According to Galeotti, liberal toleration is an act performed by the powerful 
majority over the powerless minority. Coherently, she argues that the majority 
must tolerate public expressions of new and minoritarian forms of life. In the 
previous section, I argued against the idea that the minority is tolerated while the 
majority undertakes its process of moral learning. In this section I challenge the 
assumption that liberal toleration is, and should be, an act performed by the 
majority. 
 I have already described Galeotti‘s assumption of a direct and exclusive 
relation between the majority and the institutions of the state. This relation allows 
the majority to define what is socially and legally accepted. For instance, it allows 
it to define the institution of the family. Since the majority believes that families 
must be constituted by heterosexual loving couples, the state tends to recognize 
those relations as the basis of the family. Acts of toleration in this respect include 
a wide range of compromises granted to different forms of families. For instance, 
toleration might grant homosexuals access to the same social protections to which 
married couples are entitled, but might deny them the right to actually get married 
and adopt children. Toleration can also be exercised by recognizing to de facto 
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couples exactly the same rights married couples enjoy, including the right to adopt 
children, but denying homosexuals the symbolic recognition of being a ‗married‘ 
couple. The majority, which only recognizes heteronormativity,
28
 decides what is 
to be officially accepted as a family and tolerates deviations from such norms.  
However, toleration can also be performed by excluded minorities. 
Arguably, these acts of toleration can be performed only within liberal democratic 
regimes in which the traditional liberal individual freedoms are recognized by the 
constitution or by other official institutions. This institutional characteristic of 
liberal democracies intends to guarantee that recognized rights are not decided by 
the majority for the majority. Thus, against Galeotti‘s assumption regarding the 
direct relationship between the institutions of the state and the majority, political 
constitutions in liberal democratic states explicitly intend to protect pluralism and 
minorities. Expressed in other terms, it can be said that political constitutions are 
not necessarily hegemonic in Gramsci‘s sense, for they are not necessarily 
expressions of the institutional normalization of dominant ideologies.
29
   
Political constitutions empower minorities from within the institutions of 
the state. This means that oppressed and marginalized social groups—who, as a 
matter of fact are not necessarily minorities—advance claims for recognition 
appealing to principles that are already entrenched in the conception of justice 
upon which the institutions of the state are grounded. This is why same-sex 
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marriage activists in liberal democracies usually do not pursue constitutional 
reforms or constituent processes, but denounce the unconstitutionality of a 
specific law or regulation. They do not seek recognition properly speaking, for 
political communities grounded on liberal and democratic principles have already 
recognized them. What they seek is real compliance by the state to an already 
implemented conception of justice and its existing institutions. 
I the previous section I argued that toleration of oppressed and 
marginalized social groups categorizes them as second-class citizens. Now I am 
making a further step, for I am arguing against the claim that a society is 
virtuously tolerant if the majority tolerates an oppressed minority. Such political 
community might be tolerant but not virtuous. Virtue, as I am conceiving it here, 
consists to a great extent in the character of the political institutions: if they are 
broadly liberal and democratic, then the political community is institutionally 
virtuous. If toleration of a minority derives from the illiberal or undemocratic 
character of the institutions, then it is not possible to consider them as virtuous 
because they do not guarantee the equality and freedom of all citizens. An 
example of this latter case is the millet system implemented during the Ottoman 
Empire as described by Kymlicka.
30
 By guaranteeing liberal and democratic 
values, a virtuous tolerant political community cannot consistently claim to be 
tolerating oppressed minorities. At most, it can only recognize its failure to 
guarantee equal citizenship and to proceed in guaranteeing it.  
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Contemporary liberal democracies recognize a system of basic liberties 
that is meant to guarantee to all citizens that they will be able to lead their lives 
according to their lifelong preferences. Such preferences, it is widely argued, must 
fit within certain minimal criteria of respect for the preferences of, at least, their 
fellow citizens. Hence it is not possible for committed neo-Nazis to exterminate 
Jews, but they might be allowed to lead their lives believing in the truth of white 
supremacism. Within liberal and democratic states, neo-Nazis might be tolerated, 
provided that they restrict their behavior in such a way that the basic freedoms of 
the others are respected. The reason why it makes sense to claim that neo-Nazis 
are candidates to be tolerated and Muslim immigrants or homosexuals are not, is 
because the former hold beliefs that are in tension with the fundamental values of 
a liberal democracy while the latter do not. The only scenario the latter might be 
candidates for toleration would be if they declared themselves against the 
institutions of the liberal state. 
4. Toleration and the Expressive State  
So far, I have argued that it is possible and indeed required that liberal 
democracies tolerate the illiberal beliefs and practices of the majority. In this 
section I claim that the tools disposed by the state for exercising such toleration 
are its expressive powers. Accordingly, toleration of the majority‘s illiberalism is 
manifested by the state‘s public support of measures promoting free and equal 
citizenship to all members of the population.  
Affirmative action is the state‘s commitment to reverse the negative 
effects of injustices perpetuated in the past. It is implemented as a mechanism to 
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correct gender and racial inequalities. The underlying assumption in these cases is 
that inequalities among certain social groups in western societies are related to the 
implementation of systems of unequal citizenship that discriminated genders and 
race in the past. Such systems are known for their exclusion of some social groups 
from the public sphere. The recognition of equal and free citizenship for women 
and black people in most western countries is taken as a step forward in 
advancing justice for all. However, it is usually argued that such recognition is not 
enough for providing real access to free and equal citizenship to all. It is well 
known that the burdens of centuries of exclusion are not easy to overcome. 
Consequently, states implement policies targeted to facilitate women‘s or blacks‘ 
access to the public sphere on equal grounds. States encourage their access to the 
public life of society as a measure correcting the unequal starting points that have 
privileged white males.
31
 
 The extension of equal and free citizenship to new social groups is the 
recognition of such groups as morally equals. By adopting affirmative action, the 
state recognizes that formal equality is not enough for real equal and free 
citizenship. Therefore, it is a duty of the state to provide the institutional means 
for achieving such ideal. When the state justifies the implementation of these 
initiatives, it is arguing about its duty to procure free and equal access to 
citizenship to all. It recognizes that the system of unequal citizenship adopted in 
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the past was a consequence of an ideology that privileged one social group over 
the other and therefore expresses its commitment against such ideology. Although 
the freedom of a citizen is not to be restricted because of her beliefs  in the 
superiority of the social group to which she belongs, the state undertakes the 
initiative to discourage such beliefs through all its expressive powers.  
 The case of same-sex marriage is of similar nature. Homosexuality was 
considered a crime until recently in most western states. Moreover, prejudice 
constitutes a real threat to homosexuals in most contemporary societies.
32
 As in 
the case of women, formal recognition of equal citizenship is not enough for 
guaranteeing its enjoyment. Violence, prejudice, bias, and discrimination are still 
common in contemporary western societies.
33
 Thus, it is important that the state 
provides with an adequate institutional environment in which such harms are 
reduced. It is the duty of the state to communicate its commitment to the 
protection of the equal moral worth of homosexuals even if such initiatives 
generate controversy. The majority of citizens might endorse religious views that 
openly oppose to recognition of homosexual couples and behaviors, yet the state 
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does not owe them a justification in their own terms as to why commitment to 
equal citizenship requires expressively promoting an ethics of respect toward all 
citizens. On the contrary, citizens that oppose to such initiatives are expected to 
modify their beliefs so as to conform to the ethics of respect to all.  
Therefore, to the question about whether the state must remain inactive 
and silent with regards to discriminatory conceptions of the good, I respond 
negatively. Furthermore, I argue that in cases in which such conceptions of the 
good are held by the powerful majority that intends to deny homosexuals full 
citizenship, the state has an urgent duty to raise its voice against them. One of the 
forms this expressive agency of the state can be manifested is by making explicit 
that the relationship between the state and such majority or powerful social group 
is a relationship of toleration. This notion of toleration resembles Forst‘s 
permission conception of toleration. However, as it will be clear shortly, it has 
both liberal and liberating features.  
When the state tolerates x, it is reluctantly accepting x. This means that it 
would rather prefer that x did not exist but at the same time acknowledges that it 
is not authorized to directly intervene in its disappearance. I argue, however, that 
the state can indirectly discourage x by encouraging or protecting ¬x. If a neo-
Nazi organization is tolerated and grows in number, then the state can legitimately 
express concern about the risks such phenomenon represents. If necessary, it can 
express itself against the ideals and political projects such organization is planning 
to undertake. If these measures prove to be useless, then some initiatives directed 
to affect such growth are morally authorized. Conversely, if a neo-Nazi 
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organization fails to attract new members and therefore risks to disappear, the 
state has no duty nor interest in promoting campaigns for its rescue.
34
  
In contemporary debates about the neutrality of the state it is assumed that 
the state should not interfere with religious beliefs. Corey Brettschneider refers to 
this attitude as the ―static‖ conception of religion.35 The underlying assumption of 
such approach is that respect for religion requires respect for religion as it is now. 
This suggests that any external influence—and this is especially relevant if such 
influence is the state—that might have an effect on religion would alter its 
intrinsic nature and therefore would jeopardize it. The static conception of 
religion can be generalized to citizens‘ worldviews. Freedom of conscience 
intends to protect individuals‘ beliefs from state interference. This prima facie 
duty of non interference against citizens‘ beliefs is a natural consequence of the 
distinction between the public and the private spheres. Being issues of conscience, 
religious beliefs belong to the private sphere and therefore under no circumstances 
is the state authorized to interfere with them. From the point of view of liberal 
political theory, this approach has a notorious advantage, namely, it sets the basis 
for respect of freedom of religion and, more broadly, freedom of conscience. The 
traditional institutional arrangements of separation between the state and the 
church are usually interpreted as a mechanism to protect both religion from 
religious interference and the state from religious interference. The static 
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conception of religion seems to respect this ideal and therefore does not seem to 
report experience much ‗religious‘ conflict.  
However, Brettschneider argues, the static conception of religion poses a 
delicate problem. Within liberal and democratic states, there are religions and 
secular moral worldviews that are openly illiberal, that is, that explicitly oppose to 
recognizing the constitutive political values of a democratic state. Members of the 
Ku Klux Klan, for instance, are openly against recognizing citizenship status to 
Afro-Americans and therefore are against core values of the underlying principles 
of a liberal democratic political system.  
Illiberalism, however, does not need to be expressed in terms of radical 
beliefs against the values of freedom and equality. As I described above, the 
Roman Catholic Church‘s official views about homosexuality—even under Pope 
Francis I—are also an example of illiberalism. According to the static conception 
of religion, interferences with the way religions are constituted are generally 
considered as illegitimate uses of state power and therefore the state is required to 
remain silent with regards to the Church‘s opposition to free and equal citizenship 
for homosexuals.   
The private-public distinction has been the subject of many criticisms, 
however. The most salient one is that it should not be understood as showing the 
limits for legitimate state power. In other words, the distinction must not entail 
any consequence of the sort that within the private sphere state power is 
illegitimate.
36
 Brettschneider proposes the ―principle of public relevance‖ as a 
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devise to identify where to draw the scope of the legitimate use of coercive state 
power. According to this principle, ―beliefs and practices that conflict with the 
ideal of free and equal citizenship can be of public concern, and should be 
changed to make them compatible with democratic values.‖37 The principle 
applies to institutions that are traditionally conceived as belonging to the private 
sphere, such as civil society organizations and the family. According to this 
principle, private issues of the kind of internal dynamics of a family become 
public issues as soon as such dynamics hinder the status of free and equal 
citizenship of its members.
38
 Hence, if there is widespread opposition to recognize 
equal rights to all citizens, the state is authorized—and in some cases required—to 
use its power to seek a modification of such beliefs in order to guarantee a safe 
environment for the excluded social group.
39
 
The state can pursue the transformation of illiberal beliefs in several ways. 
Brettschneider argues that the family and civil organizations are potentially 
subject to public evaluation and criticism by the state. The state might be required 
to use its expressive power, and not its coercive one, to publicly criticize beliefs 
and practices that are against the ideal of equal and free citizenship. The objective 
of the state in undertaking such a task is to persuade citizens to embrace the 
values of free and equal citizenship and subsequently to encourage them to revise 
their beliefs in order to transform them into liberal ones. Thus, civil associations 
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acting upon their racist, misogynist, or homophobic beliefs will be confronted by 
the expressive power of the state.  
The expressive power of the state can be displayed in different ways. For 
instance, it can be exercised trough public discourses by state officials, by the way 
school curricula are designed, or in the decision about national holidays and 
public monuments. Furthermore, recognition of free and equal citizenship to all 
can be required as a condition for organizations seeking the ‗non-profit 
organization‘ status and thereby applying for tax-exceptions.40 These displays of 
power have to be accompanied by reasons that led it to undertake such actions. 
While neo-Nazism can be tolerated, the state is not required to adopt a neutral 
stand in the way school curricula are designed. At schools, ethnic supremacism is 
condemned.  
Brettschneider considers that the Catholic Church discriminates against 
homosexuals. However, he finds that within such institution there is a clear 
distinction between its theological arguments and its political ones. There is a 
theological distinction between gay and non-gay people, and the Church is free to 
discriminate on such grounds within its community. As a matter of fact, 
homosexuals are not officially excluded from the Catholic Church. At the political 
level, Brettschneider considers that the Church is not opposed to the recognition 
of homosexuals as citizens with political and social rights. Catholic activism 
against gay-marriage, however, constitutes an element of illiberalism that might 
need to be addressed by democratic persuasion. As things are in the United States, 
Brettschneider says, this activism does not really threaten free and equal 
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citizenship to homosexuals. If the Catholic Church participates more energetically 
in this issue, he suggests, then the Church might lose its tax-exemptions.  
Arguably, in other states the Church adopts a more confrontational attitude 
to advancements in favor of full recognition of equal rights to homosexuals. This 
is particularly evident in democracies where it represents the historical 
majoritarian religion (e.g., Latin America, Catholic Europe).  
My account of toleration points to a direction similar to Brettschneider‘s 
expressive state. However, I do not claim that the state must enroll in democratic 
persuasion. I claim that it has to adopt an attitude of explicit toleration. It does not 
exercise coercive force against illiberal groups, but it  declares that it is tolerating 
them. In doing so, the state actively supports the views of excluded social groups. 
If a religious school discriminates children on the grounds of their sexual identity, 
the state has to actively declare its commitment to the promotion of an 
environment that is not hostile toward diversity of sexual identities. In the same-
sex marriage debate, for instance, the state should display its commitment to 
equality and to support reforms seeking full recognition of rights.
41
 
This ―taking sides‖ strategy differs from the common description of 
deliberative democracy in the following way. Deliberative democracy maintains 
that disagreements in politics should be solved by an exchange of public reasons. 
However, in cases in which disagreements are reasonable, the exchange of public 
reasons would lead to no consensus. In such cases, alternative mechanisms should 
be adopted. The most common among them is what has been called the ―politics 
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of compromise.‖42 It requires that the disagreeing parties modify their respective 
views up to a point in which they can find a middle way that does not sacrifice 
their initial views. 
To identify cases of reasonable disagreements in political debates is 
already a controversial task, for the debate might get politicized. The debate about 
same-sex marriage might be considered as a case that could lead to a reasonable 
disagreement and therefore compromises might be the solution to it. Deliberative 
democracy is more akin to recognizing the reasonableness of the debate rather 
than dismissing one of the parties as unreasonable. The ―taking sides‖ approach I 
am presenting here requires the state to take the side of the view that supports free 
and equal citizenship.
43
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have advanced an argument for toleration that differs from the 
prevailing approaches in its regard. I have departed from the conceptualization of 
toleration as a relationship in which the question about toleration of illiberal 
minorities is at stake. Tolerance has been understood in current debates as the 
question about the proper relationship the state must establish with regards to 
minorities that deviate from established norms.  
It is important to stress that I have not argued against such 
characterization, for it is necessary in the context of deep pluralism of 
contemporary societies. Non-liberal minorities do raise challenges to liberal states 
and therefore addressing the question of toleration in these terms is an important 
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task. I have argued that liberal states do not always correspond to liberal societies 
and therefore I have addressed the question about the proper relationship a liberal 
state should establish with its illiberal majority. Against some conceptualizations 
of toleration, I have argued that this kind of situation is possible from a conceptual 
point of view. Furthermore, I have showed that the state has a duty to protect 
vulnerable social groups even by taking sides between opposing positions in 
political debates. This ‗taking sides,‘ I claim, does not violate the principle of 
state neutrality because it is guided exclusively by the defense and promotion of 
free and equal citizenship.  
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CHAPTER 3  
Majoritarian Beliefs and Neo-Republicanism 
In the previous chapter I developed an interpretation of toleration that seeks to 
diminish the social conditions leading to the consolidation of social norms that 
exclude and marginalizes certain social groups. This chapter provides a theoretical 
framework within which the state is entitled to reduce injustice while at the same 
time preserving the values of freedom of conscience and equality.  
According to Philip Pettit, there are two kinds of political power in the 
social world: imperium, which is the power of the state over its citizens; and 
dominium, which is the power citizens can exercise over each other.
1
 According 
to neo-republicanism, freedom is the non-arbitrary use of each of these two 
powers. A free citizen is a citizen that lives within an environment that guarantees 
that nobody will arbitrarily interfere with the (meaningful) choices she decides to 
make throughout her life. Freedom entails non-domination neither by the state nor 
by fellow citizens.
2
  
 The alleged superiority of neo-republicanism over liberalism lies in the 
fact that it identifies and addresses more cases of un-freedom than liberalism does. 
Two well-known cases of this are the relationships between benevolent masters 
with their slaves and benevolent husbands with their wives under the law of 
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coverture. Interpersonal relationships of domination that are of particular concern 
for neo-republicanism are relationships of domination in the family and at the 
workplace. And yet, republicanism and feminism still do not achieve a ―plausible 
alliance.‖3  
 In this chapter I address one criticism recently raised against neo-
republicanism, namely, that it ―does not always justify intuitively acceptable 
policies that would effectively reduce the domination of women (or others)‖.4 I 
will argue that neo-republicanism provides with tools for democratic criticism 
against arbitrary imperium. In particular, I respond to Victoria Costa‘s and Alan 
Coffee‘s claims that neo-republicanism might be bad for women and that it cannot 
address oppressive and exclusionary social norms.
5
   
1. Common avowable interests  
Imagine a community, let‘s call it Peru*, in which there is a widely shared 
religious belief that promotes arrangements under which women are subject to 
domination by their husbands. People in this community do not declare any 
interest in modifying such arrangements and thereby in reducing their related 
domination. Instead, they seem to support the collective reinforcement of those 
beliefs and customs and therefore they also seem to support the deepening of the 
disadvantaged condition of women. To the eyes of the state and of the larger 
society, such arrangements provoke clear cases of relations of private domination. 
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However, since in this case the state cannot ―claim to track common avowable 
interests‖ in seeking to reduce such blatant cases of private domination, its action 
in such direction is not authorized. The state cannot act because it cannot identify 
interests, within Peru*, in favor of reducing domination. Pettit calls this the 
―problem of the unauthorized state.‖6  
 In Peru*, there is a system of norms that reinforces private domination 
whilst at the same time is widely supported by the community. According to 
Pettit, preservation and reinforcement of these customs can be regarded as the 
common interest of the community. A ‗good‘ represents the common interest of a 
population ―so far as cooperatively avowable considerations support its collective 
provision.‖7 These are the considerations that should not be dismissed as 
irrelevant when the community entertains discussions about what should be 
collectively provided. These are not considerations that favor sections or private 
interests that the parties to a deliberation cannot find a particular reason to heed. 
They are ‗common interest considerations.‘ As Peru* illustrates, these 
considerations are not immune from promoting and reinforcing private 
domination. In this case, the state cannot track common avowable interests in 
reducing domination because the common interest of the community is in 
maintaining the system of domination. 
 The republican conception of freedom as non-domination anticipates some 
sort of context-sensitivity in the identification of the common interests. Non-
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domination is defined in terms of not finding oneself in a situation of vulnerability 
such that someone else has the power to arbitrarily interfere with one‘s life 
choices. In cases in which there is private domination and it is possible to track 
common avowable interests in reducing such domination, republicanism holds 
that state‘s action to reduce it is authorized. However, in cases in which state 
action is at odds with the common interests of the community, the state‘s 
imperium can only be perceived as an arbitrary exercise of power. A state‘s act 
seeking to reduce private domination is itself an act of domination if the state 
cannot track common avowable interests within the community.  
 What a community collectively identifies as state‘s arbitrary interference 
is, indeed, ―an issue of fact.‖ It depends on the local culture and context and its 
identification is essentially political. It does not depend on higher moral principles 
―derived from some privileged evaluative standpoints.‖8  
2. Social norms and private domination  
In her ―Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?‖9 Susan Moller Okin expressed 
skepticism about multiculturalism. Her worry was straightforward: while there are 
strong arguments to preserve cultures and grant cultural rights, such preservation 
risks perpetuating women‘s domination. One of Okin‘s most shocking examples 
is a law in Peru that exonerated rapists if they proposed to marry their victim and, 
what is worse, it exonerated co-defendants in a gang rape if one of them offered to 
marry the victim. As the New York Times reported at the time, the legislation 
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enjoyed popular support: ―a [most certainly male] Peruvian taxi driver explained: 
‗Marriage is the right and proper thing to do after a rape. A raped woman is a used 
item. No one wants her. At least with this law the woman will get a husband.‘‖10 
The law was revoked in 1997, but Peru is still far from overcoming women‘s 
domination and to direct itself into the path of gender equality. Okin‘s conclusion 
is that ―special care must be taken to look at within-group inequalities‖ 
considering that inequalities between the sexes ―are likely to be less public, and 
less easily discernible.‖ 
Echoing Okin, Victoria Costa has recently published ―Is Neo-
republicanism Bad for Women?‖11 and her worries about neo-republicanism 
mirror Okin‘s. Historically, republicanism has been hostile to women12 and 
therefore Costa‘s worries might not be surprising in principle. Neo-republicanism, 
however, has sought to change such relationship and tries to present itself as a 
plausible political doctrine advancing claims for overcoming gender domination. 
Arguably, feminists would find republican commitment to elimination or 
reduction of domination appealing. In this respect, neo-republicanism‘s focus on 
domination exercised both by the state and by citizens seems a promising agenda 
for feminism. Republicanism is explicitly committed to reduce the sort of 
domination that affects women and that liberalism has found so difficult to 
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address.
13
 In particular, it is committed to reduce domination produced by the 
social norms citizens impose to each other. It might be perplexing, therefore, that 
such intellectual and political agenda could be bad for women. 
Costa‘s claim is that Pettit‘s account of freedom is not well enough 
specified and therefore might be unable to identify and address women‘s 
domination. She acknowledges that incorporating the notion of basic liberties as a 
standard for measuring the freedom of citizens is an improvement for the efficient 
identification of cases of domination that should be addressed by the state. 
However, Costa argues, Pettit‘s list of basic liberties is too ―minimal‖ and ―it 
might still leave a significant amount of interpersonal domination in place, and 
might still discriminate against some groups.‖14 
On several occasions, Pettit has suggested that the specific and detailed list 
of basic liberties has to be determined by each society and therefore a general list 
of universal liberties is not necessary. However, he offers a list that includes the 
common freedoms protected by democratic states; namely, freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, freedom of religion, political rights, ―and so on.‖15 
According to Costa, this minimal list can be viewed as offering thin 
interpretations that allow for significant interpersonal domination. For instance, 
                                                 
13
 Namely, private domination. Perhaps the most famous exemplar of the limits of liberalism in 
dealing with gender domination is the debate feminists held with Rawls‘ inclusion of the family as 
an institution of the basic structure of society. See Okin, ―Political Liberalism, Justice, and 
Gender‖; Okin, Justice, Gender, And The Family; Martha Nussbaum, ―Rawls and Feminism,‖ in 
The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed. Samuel Freeman (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 488–520. 
14
 Costa, ―Is Neo-Republicanism Bad for Women?,‖ 933. 
15
 Pettit‘s list of basic liberties is fundamentally Rawlsian: ―there is the liberty to judging as one 
thinks best; speaking one‘s mind; associating with others; casting a vote; and putting oneself 
forward for office.‖ Philip Pettit, ―The Basic Liberties,‖ in The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: Legal, 
Political and Moral Philosophy, ed. Matthew Kramer et al. (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 203. 
91 
 
she claims, the fact that in the United States there is no right to paid maternity 
leave can be interpreted as a sign that in that society such lack of social protection 
suggests that ―at present, cooperatively admissible considerations do not support 
the idea that these benefits are essential for protecting and empowering significant 
choices in the lives of citizens.‖16 Costa argues that, under current circumstances, 
provisions for paid maternity leave are not constitutive for free citizenship.  
It is not clear what conclusion Costa intends to draw from such criticism, 
however. She might be suggesting that social protection provided by maternity 
leave is not supported by admissible cooperative considerations because they are 
not part of the society‘s common interest. Cooperative considerations are those 
that cannot be dismissed as irrelevant in discussions about what should be 
collectively provided. Thus, neo-republicanism‘s normative stand in this case 
would be that progress toward granting social protection to women would only be 
achieved when society transforms its common interests and decides to address 
severe social and economic disadvantages women suffer due to the lack of 
provisions for maternity leave. Considering this picture, all that is left is to wait 
until ―the majority of citizens are persuaded that state action is required.‖17  
However, this is not a plausible interpretation of Pettit‘s republicanism. As 
described by Costa, the denial of granting paid maternity leave is a matter of the 
way society‘s common interests are defined and not of the state‘s neglect to 
address domination. If the neglect to legally enforce such social protection is 
described in terms of what the common interests of the community are, then the 
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state is not authorized to address its related forms of domination. As it was stated 
in the previous section, state action that does not track the common interests of the 
community is an act of arbitrary exercise of power.  
Costa claims that the state‘s denial to grant paid maternity leave has ―an 
enormous impact in the lives of women,‖ for it ―generates systematic 
disadvantages and diminishes their prospects for economic independence.‖18 In 
these circumstances, it is possible to claim that the state is failing to treat women 
as equal citizens, for it is preserving and enhancing women‘s domination. 
However, within the neo-republican theoretical framework, it is not possible to 
argue, at the same time, (a) that—at present—granting paid maternity leave is not 
a cooperative admissible consideration and (b) that the state is reproducing 
domination. If (a) is true, then the state would not be authorized to act and 
therefore (b) becomes false. Conversely, the truth of (b) falsifies (a).  
When paid maternity leave is denied, the state is preserving and enhancing 
domination because it is refusing to remove the source of arbitrary interference in 
women‘s lives. The legal system that requires women to work during early 
motherhood constitutes an arbitrary exercise of power and therefore the state‘s 
imperium becomes an arbitrary form of power. Costa‘s interpretation of neo-
republicanism suggests that the government‘s failure to effectively protect women 
in this particular case shows that society‘s cooperatively avowable considerations 
do not include considerations about the negative impact that not granting 
maternity leave has on women. Such claim depends upon interpreting political 
deliberation as the only forum in which cooperatively avowable interests are 
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expressed. If republicanism considered this to be the case, then Costa‘s criticism 
would be right.  
However, it is not necessary to obtain a majority to transform 
institutionally enhanced forms of domination. Nor is it necessary to wait for a 
particular issue to become part of the political agenda in order to reduce 
domination. It is possible to track women‘s avowed interests in being recipients of 
such social protections and therefore their current neglect constitutes an act of 
domination. In other words, starting from the fact that recent governments have 
failed to address this kind of domination, it is not possible to say that 
considerations that intend to address it are not cooperatively valid considerations. 
The conclusion that can be derived, on the contrary, is that governments are 
perpetuating domination as long as the claims raised by movements requiring 
acknowledgement of social protections to women within their family life do not 
find institutional mechanisms facilitating their expression in the political sphere. 
In this sense, neo-republicanism can be interpreted as a tool for democratic 
criticism.  Republican political theory is committed to reducing domination. 
An efficient advancement in this direction requires a well-developed institutional 
system to identify relationships of domination. Once a case of interpersonal 
domination is identified, and there is a manifest interest by the dominated party—
or even someone else sharing some sort of group affinity—it is a duty of the state 
to provide the necessary means to reduce such relationship. A state that falls short 
in identifying cases of interpersonal domination is a state that is failing to seek its 
duty of reducing domination. Therefore, neglect of paid maternity leave in the 
United States is not, as Costa argues, a sign that ―cooperatively admissible 
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considerations do not support the idea that these benefits are essential.‖19 On the 
contrary, it is a sign of the state‘s failure in protecting women from arbitrary 
interference with their significant life choices.   
 
The Authorial and Editorial Dimensions 
A republican democratic system, as proposed by Pettit, has two dimensions, one is 
authorial and the other editorial. These dimensions are intended to guide the 
institutional design of the state in such a way that it is successful in ―searching out 
and generating a rich supply of presumptive common-interest policies‖ and in 
―scrutinizing and eliminating those candidate policies […] that do not advance 
common avowable interests.‖20 This two-dimensional version of democracy 
intends to guarantee that the state identifies the common avowable interests of the 
citizens and advances such interests only.
21
 
 The authorial dimension of the state consists in producing a great number 
of candidates for policies that might constitute the common avowable interests of 
a particular political community. The executive power, thus, is expected to 
advance policies that obey to the expressed interests of the citizens. Accordingly, 
citizens can conceive of themselves as indirect authors of the legislation. The 
editorial dimension of the democratic state entails avoiding that the policies 
advanced by the executive power go beyond the common interests of the political 
community. In other words, it implements mechanisms of control that prevent 
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sectarian interests from being  advanced. More specifically, they seek to guarantee 
that private interests do not find their way within the institutions of the state.   
 The authorial and editorial dimensions of the state frame its institutions in 
such a way that it provides real opportunities to all democratic voices to be heard. 
One way in which the state might fail in reducing non-domination is by neglecting 
such opportunities. In this way, some social groups might be silenced and their 
claims for freedom would never find political echo. In this case, it is the duty of 
the state to remedy such lack of political recognition of such groups. If neglect to 
grant paid maternity leave falls into this category, the criticism should be directed 
to the state and not to the political doctrine it claims to follow (e.g. 
republicanism).  
Decisions about the common goods to be collectively provided must be 
made upon deliberation and must be decided according ―to reasons that are 
publicly admissible within the group.‖ The admissible reasons within a particular 
group might be identified in several non-controversial ways. For instance, they 
can be unanimously admissible, they can be admissible for a ―subgroup that is 
regarded as a reliable judge,‖ or they can be defined by procedural mechanisms 
aiming at resolving reasonable disagreements. Such mechanisms might include 
lotteries, impartial panels, qualified committees, or majority vote.
22
 
It is possible—and very likely—that the state fails to recognize the 
interests of minorities or groups that are not empowered. In other words, electoral 
institutions might fall short in incorporating the voice of some social groups. This 
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can be due to the costs it entails for small political organizations to be heard, or to 
the monopoly of few political parties.
23
 In both cases, the political system shows 
an exclusivist face and silences the voice of some social groups. Thus, according 
to this interpretation of neo-republicanism, the neglect of granting paid maternity 
leave in the U.S. is a demonstration of the cooptation of politics by groups that do 
not allow all political voices to express themselves and thereby to take the shape 
of real policy proposals. 
The state might be failing in both its authorial and editorial dimensions. In 
the former case, it might be silencing voices of social groups advancing claims for 
social justice. Such claims might be genuine candidates of constituting the 
common avowable interests of the political community in so far as they are 
promoting the reduction of intrapersonal domination. In the latter case, it might be 
failing to provide effective mechanisms of democratic contestation denouncing 
that the denial to grant paid maternity leave is grounded not on common interests 
considerations but rather on considerations that advance private interests. Likely, 
the reasons supporting such rejection are male-profit-based.  
As Pettit conceives it, a republican democracy must arrange its institutions 
in such a way that both the authorial and the editorial dimensions are effectively 
pursued. This makes republican democracy both participatory and contestatory. 
The authorial dimension guarantees that the power of the state is used in such a 
way that reflects the will of the people. Political autonomy, thus, is achieved in 
the traditional republican conception of self-legislation trough democratic 
government.  However, since institutions might not work perfectly and the 
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dynamics of politics is complex, the authorial dimension of democracy is not 
enough to pursue non-domination. At this point, the editorial dimension enters the 
scene and shapes democratic rule. Citizens must be able to criticize and reject 
state‘s power when it is sectarian. 
The authorial dimension of republican democracy is sometimes 
overlooked by political theorists.
24
 This might be due to the underlying theoretical 
commitment to a negative conception of freedom, which is associated with 
sensitivity towards individual freedoms. Positive liberty, which is developed 
within the Rousseaunian version of republicanism, emphasizes the role of the 
citizens in jointly deciding how political power is to be used and in jointly 
deciding what the common good is, even at the cost of the sincere opinion of an 
individual. Alan Coffe, for instance, insists on the negative character of neo-
republican freedom and therefore emphasizes its editorial/constestatory rather 
than its authorial/participatory nature. Given that neo-republicanism is grounded 
on a conception of negative freedom, democratic institutions and the definition of 
the common good cannot be aligned with a positive conception of freedom.
25
 
Coffee‘s interpretation of republicanism leads to similar problems than 
those signaled by Costa, namely, that social prejudices and cultural norms remain 
―unchecked and undetected.‖ The editorial dimension of republican democracy 
enables citizens to control the law and to scrutinize its content ―in the light of the 
community‘s prevailing norms, rejecting any element that does not track the 
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common good.‖26 However, Coffee continues, the editorial dimension cannot be 
replicated at the moment of checking the community‘s social norms that serve as 
standards for determining the common good. Since the common good is not 
determined by abstract moral principles but only by reference to other norms—the 
fact of the matter—it is the politics of the local culture which challenges social 
norms. Therefore, bias and prejudice are inescapable elements of the editorial 
dimension of republican democracy. 
I have showed, however, that the distinction between the authorial and the 
editorial dimensions of democracy is not directly related to the distinction 
between positive and negative freedoms. Coffee is right when he says that Pettit 
does not align his version of republicanism with the participatory tradition. 
However, the authorial dimension of democracy plays a fundamental role within 
the institutional design of a republican democracy, for it has to guarantee that all 
voices—and especially those of the dominated—get a hearing and a real say in 
designing what counts as the population‘s common good. The role attributed to 
the authorial dimension is to open up channels of participation to social groups 
that do not have the means to advance their claims against domination.  
3. A real life situation: Republican Spain 
A second example Costa provides to illustrate how the current version of neo-
republicanism does not capture all forms of interpersonal domination is the same-
sex marriage debate. As in the example discussed in the previous section, she 
claims that republicanism suggests that it is necessary to gain political momentum 
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in order to advance legal transformations aimed to reduce domination. It can turn 
out, she argues, that the state is not authorized to act toward reducing domination 
in this context because allowing equal rights to homosexuals is not currently a 
public interest of the society. However, she reacts, this might be due to the fact 
that there is a widely shared ideology that supports interpersonal domination or 
that the public opinion represents only the views of the powerful that control ―the 
political process and the media.‖27  
I have argued that such approach is not correct. To support the argument 
presented above, I now provide two cases—one real, the other counterfactual—
that illustrate that commitment to reduction of domination is not utterly 
constrained by the vicissitudes of electoral politics. I proceed, then, by arguing 
against the suggestion that the denial of granting same-sex marriage on equal 
grounds might be backed by the fact that the state is unauthorized to act in order 
to reduce domination in this respect.   
Former Spanish Prime Minister Manuel Rodriguez Zapatero adopted neo-
republicanism as the political doctrine to be followed by his government. This 
means the adoption of a commitment to the reduction of relations in which 
citizens are vulnerable to arbitrary interference against their will by the side of 
both private agents and the state. Particularly, it commits the government to 
reduce the dominating power collective corporations hold. For instance, to control 
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private financial support to parliamentarians, political parties, and political 
campaigns.
28
 
Another collective institution that enjoys of dominating power over 
Spanish citizens is the Catholic Church, which in 1979 agreed to become a 
financially autonomous institution by 1985. The fact that this agreement has not 
been respected, and that the state has not enforced it, indicates the power the 
Church has over the state. No government wants to confront the Church at the 
cost of losing its support. Therefore, church-state separation has not been fully 
achieved in Spain because of the excessive power of the former (the Catholic 
Church) over the latter. It can, for instance, interfere with political decision 
making processes and shape them according to its moral, political, and economic 
interests.  
Perhaps the most salient example is same-sex marriage, of which the 
Catholic Church is arguably among the most strident opponents. Same-sex 
marriage is a controversial issue in many democracies worldwide and opposition 
to it does not come from the Catholic Church only. Reducing domination in this 
field means that private agents‘—whether religious institutions or not is 
irrelevant—power to deny the right to gay couples to marry and to form a family 
has to be undermined. The Catholic Church receives public funding and attracts 
media attention whenever it pronounces its opinions on moral sensible issues such 
as same-sex marriage. It is possible to say, therefore, that the Church is in a 
situation from which it can exercise dominating power. Certainly, the debate 
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about same-marriage is influenced by a combination of aspects, of which the 
Church and the echo mass media does of it are undoubtedly significant 
contributors.  
During Republican Spain, same-sex marriage was approved. Rodríguez 
Zapatero went ahead with this reform even in the face of fierce opposition coming 
from all sides of the political spectrum—including his own political moderate 
leftist party. At the time, the issue was not in the public agenda and it was not a 
matter of public controversy among political parties. There were no empowered 
social movements pressing the public agenda into debates considering reforming 
the legislation. Approval of same-sex marriage was not an imminent debate to be 
held in the public sphere. Yet the Spanish government actively pursued the reform 
as its own initiative. Its defense of it was republican in spirit, for it appealed to 
restoration of dignity and freedom. The prime minister challenged his opponents 
referring to what Pettit calls the ―eyeball test,‖ for he called them to ―look into the 
eyes of homosexuals, and tell them they are second-class citizens.‖29  
The question Costa‘s interpretation of republicanism raises at this point is 
whether the state was authorized to act in this situation. The fact that the issue of 
same-sex marriage was not on the public agenda of Spanish politics might 
indicate that considerations about equality in this respect were not part of the 
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common avowable interests of the Spanish political community.
30
 If this is the 
case, the state was not authorized to act in such a way. However, this conclusion 
contradicts Pettit‘s—and Martí‘s—view on the issue.  
A reason explaining why the Spanish state was indeed authorized to act in 
this particular case needs to be provided. The immediate response is the factual 
observation of social movements struggling in favor of the rights of 
homosexuals—and in favor of all sexual minorities in general. Costa rightly 
points out that their visibility might be determined by their powerless situation 
and lack of access to mass media for promoting their initiatives. Neo-
republicanism acknowledges this as a form of domination and therefore it does 
not constitute a flow in the doctrine. According to neo-republicanism, lack of 
visibility of these social movements in political deliberation is a sign of a deficit 
of political representativeness rather than a sign of the common avowable 
interests of the political community. Social groups that are under conditions of 
domination will be more likely outvoted and excluded from scenarios of political 
decision making. Therefore, defining the common avowable interests of a 
political community in terms of what has voice and representativeness within 
current democratic institutions and practices would only reproduce injustice. By 
legalizing same-sex marriage, the Spanish government did not contradict the 
common good of the Spanish society; on the contrary, it provided some 
institutional mechanisms seeking to reduce arbitrary interference exercised upon a 
specific minority.  
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4. A counterfactual case: Republican Peru* 
Among numerous cases in the so called contemporary western societies, the 
Spanish case is relatively easy to analyze under the lenses of neo-republican 
political theory. In this section I show that Costa‘s suggestion that the state might 
be unauthorized to act in the case of same-sex marriage is not sound even if 
considered in counterfactual terms.  Pettit invites us to imagine a society (call it 
Peru*)  where all agree on certain moral or religious tenets. In this society, the 
common avowable interests of the community seem to support certain customs, 
―including customs that do badly by some of the parties to the cooperation, say, 
women, or those in a certain caste.‖31 If the support is unanimous, Pettit claims, 
the reinforcement of such customs is to be regarded as common interest. 
However, he says that the considerations that support the collective reinforcement 
of the custom ―are not robustly considerations of this kind; they will cease to be 
cooperatively avowable as soon as a single individual departs from the tenets in 
question.‖32  
Although the distinction between robust and fragile considerations is not 
spelt out clearly, it opens up the possibility for state action for the sake of 
reducing domination. The problem of the unauthorized state, as it turns out, does 
not really prevent the state from advancing justice in so many circumstances. In 
Peru*, for instance, it would be enough to find a single dissident to be authorized 
to provide with some way out of domination. In the actual Peruvian case quoted 
by Okin, it would be enough to find women opposing against the forms of 
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domination involved in the rape-laws in order not to consider them as part of their 
common avowable interests. The taxi driver‘s opinion, therefore, would likely be 
unrepresentative.  
Pettit has not developed the distinction between ‗robust‘ and ‗fragile‘ 
considerations for constituting the common good of a particular political 
community. A single person‘s deviation from the considerations supporting the 
reinforcement of a dominating social practice is enough not to consider such 
measure as being constitutive of society‘s common interest. Thus, the opposition 
of one single Peruvian to the rape-legislation would be enough to deem it as not 
representative of the society‘s common interests. Being ‗fragile,‘ these 
considerations can be interpreted as volatile and therefore as not constitutive of 
the core of the set of considerations defining a society‘s common interests.  
In contrast, ‗robust‘ considerations can be interpreted as playing a 
different role within the set of considerations defining the common interest of a 
community. Being core considerations, they are not volatile and therefore are not 
prompt to change. Consider the basic liberty to casting a vote, which is assumed 
to be an interest citizens are keen to protect and that democracies should not 
jeopardize. There are different justifications for taking this and other political 
rights as being fundamental and inviolable. However, nobody would say that this 
right loses appeal if there is ‗a single individual‘ who departs from exhibiting a 
fundamental interest in its protection and reinforcement. Political rights are part of 
the common interests of the citizens of a republic even if there are individuals 
claiming not to be interested in their enjoyment. A characteristic of a robust 
consideration is that the circumstantial and subjective perception citizens might 
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have of it does not directly alters the constitution of the community‘s common 
interests.  
It is certainly important to specify a clear distinction between robust and 
fragile considerations. Democratic societies must define what is to be collectively 
provided and such decisions have to be made responding to the considerations 
that, according to the standards of each community, should not be dismissed as 
irrelevant.
33
 The republican idea holds that the institutions of the state must be 
designed as to protect the freedom of the citizens. A free citizen is a citizen that 
lives within an institutional system that adequately protects her meaningful 
choices. The basic liberties are the minimal set of significant choices any free 
citizen must be able to exercise. They provide the framework within which 
citizens can freely exercise their choices without being exposed to the 
interference—or threat thereof—of others.34 It is up to each political community 
to decide which set of basic liberties it is going to protect. However, there are 
some constraints. Basic liberties must be ―as numerous as they can [consistently] 
be,‖ they also have to bear personal significance to citizens—and this is 
contextually defined—, and they must be enjoyable by all citizens on an equal 
basis.
35
 
The basic liberties a republic protects are the pre-existing conditions 
guaranteeing citizens‘ possibility to make free and meaningful choices. This is 
what gives them their ‗robust‘ character. A claim against a basic liberty would be 
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a claim grounded on its dominating nature and therefore, if sound, it would call 
for a redefinition of the whole system of basic liberties. The more fragile the 
considerations supporting the basic liberty the easier to transform its nature into 
something that needs no protection. In other words, Peru* might have 
autonomously and unanimously decided to consider the right of practice x to have 
the status of a basic liberty. Being republican, Peru* is committed to non-
domination and therefore the claim by a single citizen pointing out the dominating 
nature of x must be taken seriously. If x does indeed impede citizens from making 
meaningful choices in their lives, then x must be immediately removed from the 
set of basic liberties. The more oppressive x is, the more easily it will prove itself 
not worthy to be considered as a basic liberty. In other words, the more 
burdensome of meaningful choices x is, the more fragile the considerations 
supporting it are.  
5. Concluding Remarks  
In this chapter I have argued in favor of an interpretation of neo-republicanism as 
democratic criticism. I have showed that state commitment to freedom as non-
domination provides citizens with tools to individuate instances of domination, 
whether by the state or by private agents, and to raise claims against failures of 
the state in properly addressing such cases of domination. Accordingly, I have 
showed why Costa‘s and Coffee‘s worries about neo-republicanism being bad for 
historically marginalized social groups are not as worrisome as they present them. 
As I have showed, given that neo-republicanism does not associate the public 
opinion to the common interest, failing to politically recognize the interests of a 
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dominated social group is not a problem of neo-republicanism but rather a 
problem of the state. Hence the U.S. state is promoting domination by not 
granting paid maternity leave. This reasoning works similarly for the case of 
same-sex marriage and the possibility for homosexuals to adopt children. In these 
cases, states are failing to meet their commitments to freedom even if these are 
not ‗hot topics‘ in the public sphere.   
 As to the problem of the unauthorized state, I have argued that its scope as 
a problem is thin. Cases in which the state would indeed not be authorized to act 
reducing domination might be extremely rare, for cases like Peru* are not likely 
to exist. In order to avoid being arbitrary, the imperum of the state must coincide 
with the common interests of the political community. However, this common 
interest is not equivalent to the public opinion of the community. On the contrary, 
the common interest must be particularly sensitive to relationships of 
interpersonal domination and to cover the interests and ideas of those that are 
situated under conditions of domination. In order to avoid cases like Peru*, 
republican states are required to be particularly attentive to transformations in the 
avowable interests of the oppressed individuals, who might—sooner or later—
initiate a struggle seeking social transformation and non-domination.  
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PART II 
 
Church-State Separation and Minorities 
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So far, I have addressed issues concerning the power of majorities and the threats 
they pose for pluralism to thrive. I have focused on powerless and marginalized 
social groups that are not necessarily associated with a religious identity. The two 
chapters that form Part II address the institutional question concerning the 
separation between the state and the church. As in Part I, the main focus is on 
non-religious expressions of pluralism and the interferences they might suffer 
from powerful and majoritarian institutions. In the following two chapters, the 
focus is on the power the Catholic Church exercises in societies where 
Catholicism is the majoritarian religion and its Church is an historical political 
and social force. I investigate whether such circumstances require the 
implementation of strict church-state separation. The two chapters are 
contextually situated; Chapter 4 analyses the implementation of the principle of 
secularism in Colombia whilst Chapter 5 is focused on the Italian case. For both 
cases, I argue that strict church-state separation is justified.  
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CHAPTER 4  
On Separation and Anticlericalism 
It is generally accepted that the values of equality and freedom are at the core of 
liberalism. John Rawls‘ influential version of it, for instance, characterizes 
citizens as free and equal and develops a conception of justice in which, without 
jeopardizing these values, pluralism is preserved.
1
 Developing an institutional 
design that takes into consideration the freedom and equality of citizens faces 
challenges when questions about the proper role of religion in the political life of 
society are addressed. The issue is particularly delicate when it comes to 
discussions about the role of religion within the system of education. Sensitive 
questions about children‘s right to autonomously develop their moral worldviews, 
parents‘ right to promote their moral views on their children, the state‘s aim to 
educate good citizens, or churches‘ aim to attract more followers have to be 
properly addressed while guaranteeing everybody‘s freedom and equality.  
 The well-known principle of church-state separation plays a decisive role 
in the success—or failure—of state‘s commitment to freedom and equality. In 
some cases, it is interpreted as an antireligious principle, which leads to failures in 
protecting freedom. In other cases, it is interpreted as an inclusive pluralist 
principle, which leads to friendly environments for religious pluralism to flourish. 
In this paper, I argue that it is also interpreted in anticlerical terms. This 
interpretation, I claim, is necessary in contexts where a politically dominant 
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church controls the institutions of the state as a means to impose its moral 
worldview. 
I illustrate these interpretations by analyzing how they have crystalized in 
designing the institutions for education in the French conception of republican 
laïcité, the Anglo-Saxon conception of liberal pluralism, and the Colombian 
conception of anticlerical liberalism.  
1. Two conceptions of secularism: laïcité and liberal pluralism 
A. Republican laïcité  
The two pillars upon which French republican laïcité is built are the ―Laws of 
Education‖ (1880-1883) and the ―Law of Separation‖ (1905).2 Both are initiatives 
seeking to promote state‘s independence from the Catholic Church, which at the 
time had sovereign powers and control over governmental institutions. State‘s 
implementation of the two laws confronted the Catholic Church at the political, 
ideological, and economical levels. At the political level, confrontations emerged 
as struggles over control of governmental institutions; at the ideological level, 
confrontations emerged as struggles over the content of the moral doctrines 
citizens were expected to endorse; and at the economic level, the conflict 
consisted in attempts to undermine the economic means to advance their 
respective long term projects.
3
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The Separation Law embodied the ―classical ideal of liberal separation‖ of 
the state from the churches.
4
 It attempted to guarantee an equal right to exercise 
freedom of religion and neutrality of the state. The independence of the state from 
religion had two aims. First, it intended to differentiate functional powers between 
the state and the Catholic Church. And second, it promoted guarantees for equal 
treatment to all religions.  
The Laws of Education determined the secularization of public schools. 
They intended to replace the religious content taught at public schools with 
civic—civic humanist—education. The Catholic Church had been sustaining 
privileged access to spreading its doctrine among the younger population by 
monopolizing primary education. By taking over such monopoly, the republic 
initiated an ideological struggle in order to modify the content of the education in 
such a way that the enlightened morale laïque replaced Catholic morality.
5
   
The implementation of republican laïcité in public schools used a very 
specific interpretation of the three foundational values of the French republic, 
namely, equality, freedom, and fraternity. Equal treatment is guaranteed by state‘s 
blindness about characteristics defining pupils‘ identities, such as their religion or 
culture. Public schools are places detached from elements constituting pupils‘ 
identities and differences and therefore are places where they appear as equals.
6
 
The value of freedom is interpreted in terms of the enlightened conception of 
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5
 See, for instance, Jules Ferry‘s justification for the foundation of women teachers‘ training 
colleges all around the country. He considered that the Catholic Church maintained its power 
through its influence over women, thus, he argued that ―Women must belong to Science (and not) 
to the (Roman Catholic) Church,‖ in Baubérot, ―The Two Thresholds of Laicization,‖ 108. 
6
 A similar line of reasoning is adopted by Barry‘s strategy of privatization of cultural and 
religious differences, see Barry, Culture and Equality, chap. 2.    
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individual autonomy, which means that to be free is to live a life following self-
imposed rules only. This includes emancipation from traditional values, religion, 
established authorities, and prejudice. In this respect, republican schools are not 
neutral in relation to religion and morality. Lastly, the value of fraternity is 
interpreted in terms of a civil religion that attempted to consolidate social 
cohesion and national identity. Public schools promote cohesion trough honoring 
the republic, its institutions, and its history. The implementation of a republican 
civil religion is intended to create social cohesion by appealing to a doctrine 
different from Catholicism.
7
 
Republican laïcité was born in the midst of a confrontation against the 
Catholic Church. On the one side, the Catholic Church defended a clerical 
political power, which included preservation of control over the institutions of the 
state and of Catholicism as the moral doctrine of the French people. On the other 
side, republicans promoted state‘s autonomy from the Church‘s control. 
Historically, this project included both antireligious and anticlerical measures. 
The former can be defined as measures that intended to attack religion and to 
foster non-religious—enlightened—citizens. The latter can be defined as 
measures that intended to guarantee state‘s independence from the Catholic 
Church‘s power. In particular, it sought separation of powers, as opposed to 
imposition of one over the other.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 Rivera, Laicidad y Liberalismo, 11. 
114 
 
B. Liberal pluralism  
Liberal pluralists consider that political secularism is the best way to face the 
challenges of growing pluralism (e.g., religious and cultural). They distinguish 
between the fundamental values the state is committed to promote—the ends of 
secularism—and the institutional arrangements designed to advance such 
values—the means of secularism. The former are the values of freedom of 
conscience and equal respect, while the latter are the principles of church-state 
separation and neutrality of the state. Institutional arrangements fostering the ends 
of secularism have only an instrumental value, which makes them circumstance-
sensitive. Appeals for religious or cultural accommodations are to be decided 
upon considerations about freedom of conscience and equal respect rather than 
upon considerations about the principles of church-state separation or of neutrality 
of the state.
8
  
The distinction between the ends and the means of secularism avoids 
overemphasizing ‗separation‘ and ‗neutrality‘ formulas that can undermine 
protection of fundamental values.
9
 For instance, it avoids insistence on the 
principle of separation as justification for the French ban on headscarves at public 
schools even at the cost of undermining freedom of religion. By making explicit 
the instrumental value of the principles of secularism, liberal pluralists 
demonstrate that political secularism is neither hostile toward religion nor 
insensitive to religious and cultural pluralism. The principles of secularism are not 
                                                 
8
 Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience. 
9
 Overemphasis of such formulas is common in contemporary French political defenses of laïcité, 
see, for instance Henri Pena-Ruiz, Dieu et Marianne : Philosophie de la laïcité, Edición: édition 
revue et augmentée (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France - PUF, 2005), 225. 
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intended to undermine citizens‘ religiosity, but to guarantee the possibility to lead 
a life according to the dictates of their consciences. Nor are they insensitive to 
pluralism, for they can be adjusted according to the needs of citizens of diverse 
faiths and cultures. 
Making the principles of secularism more sensitive in their relation to 
pluralism generates a more open institutional environment for religious and 
cultural accommodations.
10
 This is particularly evident when it comes to 
acceptability of, for instance, religious presence within the institutions of the state, 
such as public schools. Joselyn Maclure and Charles Taylor have recently 
described the successful implementation of liberal pluralism in the Canadian 
province of Quebec. They highlight that institutional openness towards religious 
and cultural accommodations demonstrates that the state is not biased against such 
manifestations in the public sphere. An overlapping consensus about the 
appropriateness of the ends and the means of political secularism, they claim, has 
led to an environment in which social cohesion is guaranteed through wide and 
open respect for diversity.
11
  
The case of the place of religion within public schools is of particular 
interest. Until 2008 the Canadian Province of Quebec had a strict policy of 
religious-free public schools. Protestant and Catholic education were banned. The 
2008 liberal-pluralist reform did not ratify the ban but instead implemented the 
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 Charles Taylor has defended this emphasis on diversity in several of his previous work, see 
Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann, 
Expanded paperback edition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 40; Taylor, 
―Modes of Secularism.‖ 
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 Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, 20–26. 
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―Ethics and Religious Culture‖ curriculum.12 The reason why they did not ratify 
the ban was that the state‘s acknowledgment the ―importance that the spiritual 
dimension of existence holds for some people.‖13 In contrast with the historical 
adoption of a notion of republican laïcité,
14
 Quebec gradually adopted a liberal 
pluralist model that allowed public manifestations of religion within public 
schools as long as they do not interfere with the rights of others.
15
  
Allowing more religious presence within the institutions of the state is not 
limited to school curricula. Protection of freedom of conscience and of equal 
respect overrides the principles of separation and neutrality in a way that 
republican laïcité would deem as unacceptable. According to liberal pluralism, 
requiring public school teachers not to wear religious clothing and symbols 
illegitimately restricts their freedom of conscience. Their performance at work is 
not undermined by their public demonstrations of faith, which, moreover, does 
not necessarily have a proselytizing nature.
16
 
 The usual argument against allowing public school teachers to wear 
religious symbols is that it goes against state neutrality. If state officials display 
religious symbols, they might be perceived as being representatives of both the 
state and their respective institutional religion. Furthermore, since they are 
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 Secularization of Quebec schools came about in 1998, when secondary schools were removed 
from religious control. The ―Ethics and Religious Culture‖ curriculum was introduced in 
September 2008. Ibid., 57.  
13
 Ibid., 58. 
14
 Whether or not public officials have a right to display their religious convictions in the 
performance of their duties is not a question for republican laïcité Ibid., 42–43. 
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 Micheline Milot, ―The Secular State in Quebec: Configuration and Debates,‖ Diversité 
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 Pedagogical reasons may justify some restrictions (e.g. wearing a full veil), however, there are 
no reasons to restrict the use of hijabs Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of 
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representatives of the state, it might be perceived that the state is privileging one 
religion over the others. However, Maclure and Taylor consider that ―what 
matters, above all, is that such officials demonstrate impartiality in the exercise of 
their duties.‖17 After all, it is not fair to judge someone‘s impartiality just on the 
grounds of their religious convictions. In other words, it is not fair to assume that 
every act of manifestation of one‘s own religious convictions is an act of religious 
proselytism. Therefore, in stark contrast to republican institutional arrangements 
at public schools, liberal pluralism is open to wide permissions for religious 
presence within them. 
 So far, I have presented two of the most influential conceptions of 
secularism and I have highlighted how they settle the question about the place 
religion can legitimately occupy within public schools. According to the 
republican model, protection and promotion of the values of equality, freedom, 
and fraternity require keeping religious content outside the doors of public 
schools. In contrast, the liberal pluralist model recognizes the importance of 
religion in people‘s lives and assumes an accommodationist attitude that opens up 
public schools‘ doors for religious content. In the second section of this paper I 
focus on how secularism has been interpreted in Colombia and how it has been 
nurtured by both models so far described. I argue that, while it is important to 
celebrate its liberal pluralist spirit, it is fundamental not to forget its republican, or 
anticlerical, dimension.  
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2. Secularism in Colombia  
A. Religious pluralism  
Before presenting the conception of secularism as it is currently applied in 
Colombia, it is worth mentioning the old system of religious establishment to 
which it is a reaction. Catholicism was an established religion in Colombia from 
1886 to 1991. The Catholic doctrine was officially recognized as the guide to 
frame the content of private and public moralities. Religious education was 
mandatory in public schools and private Catholic schools were subsidized by the 
state, legislation about the family could not contradict the Holy See‘s doctrine, 
fiscal exemptions were recognized to the Church, and the clergy was subjected to 
an autonomous criminal code.
18
 
 The Constitution of 1991 dissolved the religious establishment that had 
ruled the country for more than a century. It is grounded on the values of equality 
and freedom, interpreted as fundamental conditions for pluralism to prosper. 
Since the previous institutional arrangement recognized official status to 
Catholicism, Colombian commitment to pluralism, freedom, and equality required 
the implementation of a system that undermined the privileged position enjoyed 
by the Catholic Church until 1991.  
Commitment to equality and freedom as guarantees of pluralism raises a 
difficulty in determining how to interpret secularism. The system of privileges 
                                                 
18
 A Concordat signed in 1887 and ratified in 1973 intensified the already close relations between 
the Colombian state and the Catholic Church as established in 1886‘s constitution.  Nowadays 
most of the articles of the Concordat have been declared unconstitutional, however, the 
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enjoyed by the Catholic Church is unsustainable within a system that intends to 
guarantee an equal system of freedom. An interpretation of secularism, more or 
less captured by the French model of laïcité, is to remove all Catholic Church‘s 
privileges and to interpret secularism as absolute neutrality and strict separation. 
Another interpretation of secularism, more or less captured by the model of liberal 
pluralism, is to equalize the status of all religions up to a point where none is 
privileged. According to this interpretation, religion receives special status, for the 
state assumes a strong commitment in guaranteeing effective conditions for free 
exercise on equal grounds to all religious denominations.
19
 Colombian 1991‘s 
Constitution opted for the latter interpretation. 
 Secularism is turned into a political value to which religious associations 
can appeal in order to be granted effective means for their free and equal exercise 
of religious practices. Since the implementation of the new system of secularism, 
numerous ―free exercise‖ cases have reached to the Constitutional Court, which 
has usually decided in favor of religious minorities. A widespread justification for 
granting accommodations and exemptions to religious minorities refers to ‗equal 
treatment‘ claims with respect to the Catholic Church. For instance, in 1997 the 
Court decided that tax exceptions enjoyed by the Catholic Church but not by other 
churches, such as the Christian Church ―La Casa Sobre la Roca,‖ violated the 
principle of equality. Instead of derogating the exception to the Catholic Church, 
the Court extended it to all recognized Christian Churches. In 2006, the Court 
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recognized the right to an adequate space for worship to a prisoner devout of a 
Pentecostal Church. As a matter of fact, the prison had already arranged proper 
spaces for other three religious confessions and its reticence to open up another 
one was grounded on practical considerations (e.g. lack of space) rather than on 
any sort of religious discrimination. The Court required the prison to adapt an 
adequate space for the Pentecostal cult so the prisoner‘s rights could be 
guaranteed.
20
 
 The Colombian interpretation of secularism had implications in the way 
the relationship between religion and public education was to be settled. 
Mandatory Catholic education was not compatible with a system seeking 
promotion of pluralism and equal respect for the liberties of all. Thus, a new 
relationship between religion and public education needed to be defined. This, 
however, also raises problems of interpretation of the principles of secularism. 
One alternative is to exclude religious content from the educative system and 
thereby leaving total freedom to families to frame their own religious beliefs and 
practices. Under this interpretation, the state would refrain from aligning to any 
religious confessions and therefore equal treatment would be guaranteed by 
omission. A second alternative is to keep religious education within public 
schools while withdrawing its mandatory character. In an institutional order that 
aims at respecting all religions equally, however, defining the content of the 
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religious course remains a problem, for such content must give no privileges to 
any religious confession.  
This problem was solved by a governmental decree in 1998.
21
 The 
government established the same privileges to recognized Christian Churches, 
which at the time were nineteen. Based on the principle of religious freedom, the 
decree recognizes the right to these churches to provide, upon demand, religious 
assistance in state offices, including public schools. This means that the Catholic 
Church and nineteen recognized Christian Churches are entitled to provide 
religious education in public schools if such education is requested by the school. 
In order to protect freedom of conscience within the school, children cannot be 
obliged to take the religion course.   
B. Cultural pluralism 
The implementation of the principles of secularism is not limited to guaranteeing 
equal status to all religions. It is also intended to address the challenges raised by 
cultural minorities, particularly indigenous communities.
22
 In this respect, the 
anticlerical dimension of secularism becomes clear since it is intended to 
undermine the power of the Catholic Church to spread its doctrine using the 
institutions of the state.  
 According to the Constitution of 1886, private institutions were entitled to 
provide (free) education in areas unreachable by the state. This allowed Catholic 
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missionaries to bring education to indigenous communities, who have been 
historically marginalized in Colombia. Undoubtedly, the missionary activity 
provided a service the state was physically unable to offer. However, it was 
planned as a project of conversion of indigenous communities to the Catholic 
faith and of promotion of the mainstream culture (e.g. language and lifestyles).  
The new institutional order recognized that Catholic and Christian 
missions within indigenous communities perpetuated a wrong historically 
committed against them. The purported provision of a basic good (e.g., education) 
turned into the disavowal of another basic good (e.g., access to one‘s culture). In 
order to remedy such injustice, the new Constitution withdrew the permission of 
religious institutions to provide education to indigenous communities and 
recognized their right to self-determination. This includes the right to preserve, 
promote, and spread their cultural practices and religious traditions. 
Within an institutional arrangement that seeks promotion of pluralism 
under the values of freedom and equality, restrictions to freedom of religion need 
a strong justification. Standard understandings of freedom of religion involve a 
right to promote a specific faith. In Colombia, this right does not apply to cases in 
which such exercise involves evangelization of indigenous communities. The 
justification of such restriction is found in the necessity to repair an historical 
injustice perpetuated against these communities. Their marginalization has led 
them in a condition of vulnerability such that external protections from the 
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mainstream culture are urgent in order to guarantee them access to primary 
goods.
23
  
The mechanism used to protect indigenous communities was to limit the 
Catholic Church‘s power to assume functions of the state and to determine 
indigenous communities‘ private moralities. In other words, the state confronted 
the Church‘s clericalism and undermined it as a mean to guarantee the rights of 
indigenous communities. 
C. Anticlerical Liberalism? 
So far, I have presented some of the most salient features of Colombian 
interpretation of secularism since the instauration of 1991 Constitution. At first 
sight, there seem to be more similarities to Anglo-Saxon liberal pluralism than to 
French laïcité. Liberal pluralism is strongly committed to pluralism and therefore 
is generous in granting accommodations and exceptions to the law on ―free 
exercise‖ grounds. In this section I want to make explicit some aspects that make 
Colombian interpretation of secularism similar to French laïcité. I consider these 
to be anticlerical aspects of Colombian liberal secularism.  
Political clericalism is the political project that seeks to use the institutions 
of the state to frame the morality, both public and private, of a given society.
24
 
The system of religious establishment implemented in Colombia between 1886 
and 1991 is an example of political clericalism at work, for legislation had to be 
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consistent with Catholicism and it was a duty of the state to preserve Catholic 
morality.  
Colombian Constituent Assembly in 1991 decided to guarantee an 
institutional regime that acknowledged pluralism. However, recognizing pluralism 
under the grounds of freedom of conscience and equal respect is not necessarily 
linked to a secular and disestablished state. It is possible, for instance, to conceive 
an established and privileged religion within a political system that is respectful of 
pluralism. In principle, religious establishment is not incompatible with full 
guarantees of freedom of conscience and equal respect.
25
 Yet Colombia 
disestablished Catholicism as a means to guarantee pluralism.  
 The sort of religious establishment that Colombia experienced is 
characterized by the pervasive presence of the Catholic Church in the private and 
public life of society. Social and political norms were determined under the 
guidance of a religious doctrine. The state used its coercive power to impose 
Catholicism as the only morality socially and politically accepted. An institutional 
arrangement that promotes such uses of state power is intrinsically incompatible 
with protection and promotion of values like freedom of conscience and equal 
respect. In the face of this situation, a genuine acknowledgment of pluralism in 
Colombian public and private moralities required applying anticlerical principles 
of secularism. Thus, the process of disestablishment needs to be interpreted as a 
process that undermined the capacity of the Catholic Church to use the institutions 
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of the state to impose its doctrine at the public and private levels. Implementing 
an institutional arrangement that protects religious and cultural pluralism requires 
opening up spheres in which private moralities are freely determined according to 
a plurality of moral conceptions. The anticlerical spirit involved in the process of 
disestablishment allows pluralism to frame citizens‘ moral worldviews.  
D. Anticlericalism and Schools 
I have discussed Colombian version of secularism from its anticlerical dimension 
rather than from its liberal pluralist dimension. I have defined anticlericalism as 
the political attempt to undermine the Catholic Church‘s power to use the 
institutions of the state to impose its moral worldview. Now, I want to show that 
this approach to secularism adequately explains why it is still relevant within the 
system of education.  
 Projects of political secularism have direct impacts in the way the 
relationship between religion and public education is conceived. Indeed, often the 
success of a regime of secularism is assessed in terms of the way it performs at 
the level of public schools. Perhaps the most important reason why public 
education is so crucial in these debates is because of the impact education has on 
the formation of the character of future individuals and citizens. On the one side, 
religious associations consider that appropriate religious education is crucial in 
the development of a good believer; and, on the other side, republicans believe 
that appropriate civic education is crucial in the development of a good citizen. 
Naturally, there is no principled incompatibility between an education that is 
religious and one that is purely civic. Yet history provides several cases in which 
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they were considered to be irreconcilable. In such cases, freedom of conscience 
and equal respect were the first ones to be sacrificed.    
 At the level of education, Colombian anticlericalism manifested itself in 
two particularly noticeable ways, namely, the removal of the mandatory religious 
(e.g. Catholic) course in public education and the withdrawal of the permission to 
evangelize indigenous communities. These measures are anticlerical because they 
undermine the capacity of the Catholic Church to use state institutions in 
imposing its faith. It might be argued that the anticlerical project at the level of 
public education has succeeded in both avoiding that a particular religion is 
imposed upon pupils and guaranteeing that their education is provided in an 
environment of respect for religious and cultural pluralism. However, the process 
is not over yet.   
 In the last decade, Colombia decriminalized therapeutic abortion and 
advanced in the process of recognizing rights to non-traditional families (e.g. gay 
families). The initiative in favor of therapeutic abortion was justified in terms of a 
lack of state protection to women that were in life-threatening circumstances. 
Ongoing initiatives in favor of decriminalization of abortion during the first 
trimester, still illegal, are justified by claims for the recognition of already 
transformed gender roles in contemporary Colombia. Supporters of the pro-choice 
movement claim that the traditional conception of what it means to be a woman, 
defined in terms strictly associated to family life, does not capture the way 
contemporary women perceive themselves. Accordingly, they claim that women 
must be free to decide when to start a family and the state should not interfere 
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with that choice.
26
 The initiative in favor of recognition of equal rights for gay 
families appeals to a similar strategy, for it claims recognition by the state of new 
conceptions of the family that are already part of Colombian social practices. 
Social norms are constantly changing, and advocates for abortion and equality for 
gay families are struggling for being recognized as valid forms of life.  
 The claims of the two initiatives have been partly recognized by the state. 
Schools, both private and public, have implemented programs creating adequate 
environments for the new social realities. These are campaigns about sexual 
health, reproductive rights, and sexual diversity. Students in public and private 
schools are acquainted with the existence, functioning, and efficacy of 
contraceptives, as well as with their respective health impact. In matters of 
reproductive rights, students are informed about the cases abortion is permitted 
and what the duties of the state in this respect are (e.g., that public hospitals have 
to provide the service to all women that are entitled to it). Campaigns raising 
awareness of sexual diversity and against bullying homosexual children have also 
been carried out. Although there are not anti-discrimination laws—some bills 
have been unsuccessfully discussed at parliament—public schools are required to 
respect sexual diversity and to act against manifestations of discrimination on 
grounds of sexual preferences.
27
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 The Catholic Church opposes all these initiatives and refuses their 
implementation in both private and public schools.
28
 The right to refuse to 
recognize new social norms is granted by freedom of conscience and freedom of 
religion. The Catholic Church is free to determine its doctrine in such a way that 
refuses to recognize social transformations with respect to new conceptions of 
gender roles, the family, or sexual diversity. This freedom, however, does not 
allow the Church to use the institutions of the state in order to impose its beliefs 
and to oppose state campaigns in favor of recognizing new expressions of moral 
pluralism. Active opposition of the Catholic Church to state‘s recognition of 
moral pluralism shows its reluctance to recognize pluralism and in adjusting itself 
to democratic rule.  
State‘s success in recognizing moral pluralism within the education system 
depends on its capacity to curb Catholic Church‘s political clericalism as it is 
exercised at the level of public (and private) schools. The anticlerical dimension 
of secularism, I have showed, provides an adequate normative framework for 
guaranteeing state‘s commitment to recognizing moral pluralism. 
3. Concluding Remarks  
In this paper I have presented three interpretations of the principle of church-state 
separation. In particular, I identified how they specify the place religion occupies 
within the institutional system of public education. I have showed that the 
principle of church-state separation can adopt an antireligious nature, which 
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prescribes exclusion of religion from public schools on the grounds of the 
promotion of a superior ideology. It can also adopt a liberal pluralist nature, which 
strongly relies on protection of freedom of conscience and allows for a wide 
system of accommodation on religious grounds. Lastly, it can adopt an anticlerical 
nature, which emphasizes the necessity to guarantee that no religious institution 
uses the institutions of the state to impose its doctrine. In this case, exclusion of 
religion from public schools is grounded on a commitment to protection of 
freedom of conscience in so far as it seeks to guarantee that no religion is imposed 
on pupils. What differentiates the antireligious interpretation from the anticlerical 
one is that the former imposes a moral doctrine that replaces religion while the 
latter seeks an environment in which no moral doctrine is imposed on pupils 
through the use of the institutions of the state. The former tries to undermine 
religion while the latter tries to undermine the capacity of a religious institution to 
illegitimately impose its doctrine. I have argued that, in contexts like the 
Colombian one, Catholic Church‘s opposition to state initiatives that seek to 
protect new socially accepted ways of life shows the necessity of the anticlerical 
interpretation of the principle of church-state separation. Commitment to 
pluralism requires adopting effective means to protect its diverse manifestations, 
whether religious, cultural, and moral. 
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CHAPTER 5  
Italy and the Principle of (Strict) Church-State Separation  
Post-secular theory, open secularism, and liberal pluralism, have proposed to 
modify the way the question about the proper role of religion in the public sphere 
is addressed.
1
 These three views have in common that all adopt a welcoming 
attitude of religion in the public sphere. Furthermore, they consider that the 
principle of separation between the state and the church(es) was biased against 
religion and grounded on a secularistic ideology.
2
 Consequently, they propose to 
abandon the way principles of church-state separation are understood and to 
abandon the expectative of privatization of religion.
3
 They emphasize on 
requirements of mutual learning, recognition, participation, and inclusion of 
diversity. Thus, instead of insisting in raising walls of separation, they promote 
what they call an ―ethics of citizenship‖4 or an ―ethics of diversity.‖5  
In this chapter I argue that this approach must be taken with caution, for it 
might overlook crucial political problems proper of several contemporary western 
democracies. I claim that this approach pays too much attention to contemporary 
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 See, respectively Habermas, ―Religion in the Public Sphere‖; Bouchard and Taylor, Building the 
Future. A Time for Reconciliation; Jocelyn Maclure, ―Political Secularism and Public Reason. 
Three Remarks on Audi‘s Democratic Authority and the Separation of Church and State,‖ 
Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series) 3, no. 2 (2013): 37–46. 
2
 Ferrara, ―The Separation of Religion and Politics in a Post-Secular Society,‖ 79; Maclure, 
―Political Secularism and Public Reason. Three Remarks on Audi‘s Democratic Authority and the 
Separation of Church and State.‖ 
3
 The most visible defenders of religious restraint in political deliberation are John Rawls, ―The 
Idea of Public Reason,‖ in Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 
212–54; Audi, Democratic Authority and the Separation of Church and State. 
4
 Habermas, ―Religion in the Public Sphere.‖ 
5
 Zucca, A Secular Europe. 
131 
 
pluralism and overlooks the possibility to identify the unfinished project of 
political secularism. The claim that political secularism is an unfinished project 
might be interpreted as a defense of the secularist ideal of the secularization 
thesis. As it will become clear, I do not attempt to defend a political project that 
purposely aims religions‘ waning. On the contrary, I will defend a view according 
to which political secularism attempts to undermine any sort of manipulation of 
the institutions of the state by religious organizations.  
The question about the proper role of religion in the public sphere in certain 
contexts has two dimensions. First, it has to deal with the challenges derived from 
the fact of pluralism, which is understood as a consequence of the ―diversification 
of immigration‖ and the transformation of religious beliefs in contemporary 
societies.
6
 And second, it has to deal with the internal struggle between the state 
and a politically powerful religious institution for the control of the institutions of 
the state. I argue that the post-secular approach overlooks the latter.  
The paper is divided as follows; in the first section I introduce the post-secular 
reaction to the ―secularization thesis.‖ In sections two and three, I focus on one 
particular case in which the post-secular approach does not address the second 
dimension stated above, namely, the Italian controversy about the display of 
                                                 
6
 Maclure, ―Political Secularism and Public Reason. Three Remarks on Audi‘s Democratic 
Authority and the Separation of Church and State,‖ 37; Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and 
Freedom of Conscience, 57–58; François Boucher, ―Freedom of Religion and Freedom of 
Conscience in Postsecular Societies,‖ Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series) 3, no. 2 (2013): 
159–200; Dieter Grimm, ―Conflicts Between General Laws and Religious Norms,‖ in 
Constitutional Secularism in an Age of Religious Revival, ed. Susanna Mancini and Michel 
Rosenfeld (New york, NY: OUP Oxford, 2014), 4. 
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crucifixes in public schools. In section four I conclude by arguing in favor of a 
principle of strict separation.
7
 
1. Secularism: from hostility to recognition 
The secularization thesis predicts the decline of religion and the privatization of 
religious beliefs. As a sociological explanation, it is a product of modernity, for it 
is influenced by the enlightenment, capitalism, and the consolidation of the 
modern state. Sociologists such as Marx, Weber, or Durkheim considered that the 
more modern a society is the more secular it will be.
8
 Accordingly, the diverse 
‗laws of church-state separation‘ approved during the consolidation of the modern 
states were intended to promote or facilitate the process of privatization of 
religion.  
 Whether this thesis is mistaken depends upon how ―secularization‖ is 
understood. Charles Taylor distinguishes at least three senses of the term. The 
first refers to ―the emptying of religion from autonomous social spheres,‖ 
particularly to the political sphere; the second refers to the degree on which 
people turns away from God and no longer go to Church; and the third refers to a 
move from a society where ―belief in God is unchallenged […] to one in which it 
is understood to be one option among others.‖9 These distinctions help to 
understand why a highly religious society can rank at the same time as highly 
                                                 
7
 Rather than being an exception, the Italian case is but one exemplar among many in which a 
principle of strict separation might be needed. Similar arguments can be made with virtually all 
Catholic Europe and Latin America.  
8
 See, for instance: ―In the secularist reading, we can envisage that, in the long run, religious views 
will inevitably melt under the sun of scientific criticism and that religious communities will not be 
able to withstand the pressures of some unstoppable cultural and social modernization,‖ 
Habermas, ―Religion in the Public Sphere,‖ 15. See also, Zucca, A Secular Europe, chap. 1; 
Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, chap. 1; Casanova, ―Secularization, Religion, 
and Multicultural Citizenship,‖ 23. 
9
 Taylor, A Secular Age, 2–3. 
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secular. Such society can be religious in the third sense and fairly secular in the 
second one.  
The secularization thesis understood ―secularism‖ in Taylor‘s second 
sense and therefore mistakenly predicted religious vanishing. In contrast, post-
secular approaches acknowledge the fact that the  secular world is secular in the 
third sense. The prefix ―post‖ in ―post-secular‖ highlights the acceptance of 
secularism in the third sense and its accompanying idea that religion is not 
disappearing, but that has become a view— ―frequently not the easiest to 
embrace,‖10—among other competing views.11 
Habermas‘ post-secular ―ethics of citizenship‖ does not involve the liberal 
requirement of religious restraint as proposed, among others, by Rawls.
12
 
Habermas argues that all citizens must acknowledge that their respective 
contributions in public debate can be ―serious candidate(s) to transporting 
possible truth content.‖13 Consequently, a post-secular society is ―epistemically 
adjusted‖ in such a way that gives religion its due respect. A post-secular ethics of 
citizenship requires two particular kind of civic duties: first, religious citizens 
have the duty to incorporate into their respective faiths the ―secular legitimation 
of constitutional principles;‖14 and second, secular citizens must learn not to 
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 Ibid., 3. 
11
 There is much controversy about what ―post-secularism‖ means. I am not going to grasp out 
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encounter their religious fellow citizens with reservations due to their religious 
mindset. ―Secular citizens—Habermas says—in civil society and in the political 
public sphere must be able to meet their religious fellow citizens as equals.‖15 
Importantly, this latter requirement includes a duty to engage in the cooperative 
task to translate sectarian contributions into political deliberations in cases in 
which their holders are unable to do so by themselves.
16
 Western societies have to 
―adjust to the continued existence of religious communities in an increasingly 
secularized environment.‖ This adjustment implies acknowledging religions as 
valid communities of interpretation in the public arena of secular societies. This 
characteristic acknowledges them as valid sources of political claims in contested 
issues such as abortion, active euthanasia, protection of animals, or climate 
change.
17
  
2. Contexts Matter: “The Concordat’s Distortion”  
Alessandro Ferrara argues that the presence of the Vatican in the core of Italian 
capital has more than symbolic relevance.18 Political institutions defining the 
relation between the church—the Catholic Church—and the Italian state cannot 
underestimate the relevance of such structural contingency.19 Ferrara 
distinguishes between mono-confessional and pluri-confessional contexts.20In the 
former, religious neutrality is achieved through a bargaining process between two 
independent institutions, namely, the state and a particular religious organization. 
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 Ibid., 29. 
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 Habermas, ―Religion in the Public Sphere,‖ 10–11. 
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 Habermas, ―Notes on Post-Secular Society,‖ 20. 
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 Alessandro Ferrara, The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment (New 
Directions in Critical Theory) (Columbia University Press, 2008), 200. 
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In the latter, neutrality of the state is achieved due to a more or less equal power 
of different religious organizations. 
In a mono-confessional context like Italy, the situation of the dominant 
confession is such that it does not find a counterbalance by other ―religious 
cultures‖ and, furthermore, has the means to silence political initiatives and to 
frustrate political careers of their opponents.
21
 As a consequence, Italian Catholic 
Church is in a position to use its spiritual influence for political ends, a behavior 
that contradicts the liberal project of ―a free and neutral public space.‖22 This state 
of affairs can be described as an institutionalization of political participation of 
the Catholic Church.  
An important dimension of the distinction is the fact that the ―classical 
liberal picture‖ of the emergence of religious neutrality is related to the pluri-
confessional context but not to the mono-confessional one.
2324
 Such difference 
plays a fundamental role in framing the institutional arrangements that regulate 
state-church(es) relations. In the former case, given the fact of religious pluralism, 
people‘s drawing of what is tolerable and what is not derives in the neutrality of 
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the state, which is conceived as state‘s sovereign autonomy.25In contrast, in the 
latter case, the two ―autonomous and sovereign‖ powers bargain their respective 
scopes of political and social influence. Such bargaining process defines church-
state relations and settles the threshold of what is tolerable and what is not in 
function of the bargaining power of the two actors.
26
 Therefore, toleration in Italy 
is conditioned by the Holy See‘s stand in morally sensible issues. The outcome of 
such context, according to Ferrara, is a sui generis religious neutrality that can be 
reconciled ―only with difficulty‖ with the liberal ideal of equality and that would 
lead to weak versions of political secularism.
27
    
The picture Ferrara draws about the bargaining process between only two 
actors must be understood in a very specific sense. Otherwise it may conflict with 
the inherently pluralist character of Italian Constitution. As Susana Mancini 
describes it, the Italian constituent assembly included different sectors of society, 
which contributed to specify the principles of its basic structure. The outcome is a 
constitution that ―reflects the interests of all the political forces […] that sat in the 
Constituent Assembly.‖ Some parts of the Constitution reflect communist and 
socialist interests, such as aspects concerning workers‘ rights, while other parts 
reflect the Catholic Church concerns, such as regulations about marriage and the 
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family.
28
 From this perspective, the Italian Constitution is pluralist because it 
included a broad spectrum of political organizations.  
3. Italian secularism: weak or incomplete? 
The post-secular approach faces challenges when it is confronted to 
monoconfessional societies in which the majoritarian religion is politically 
powerful and closely entrenched within the institutions of the state. The challenge 
for post-seculars is that in mono-confessional contexts such proposal is deemed to 
privilege the majoritarian religion and therefore to discriminate against minorities.  
Consider the case of Italy.  
Italian secularism is better understood as it was described and defended 
during the famous Lautsi case. The controversy started in 2002, when an Italian-
Finnish marriage requested the removal of the crucifixes in the public school their 
children were attending to. They argued that crucifixes violated the principle of 
secularism as embraced by the Italian state. The case arrived to the Veneto 
Administrative Court and then to the Supreme Administrative Court. Both 
coincided that crucifixes do not violate the principle of secularism (laicità).
29
 
Afterwards, the case arrived to the European Court of Human Rights. On 
November 2009, a Chamber of the Second Section of the Court considered that 
crucifixes violated the European Convention of Human Rights. However, in 2010 
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the Italian government, alongside numerous governmental and religious 
organizations, reacted and appealed to the Grand Chamber of the European Court, 
which in March 2010 acknowledged Italy‘s autonomy in deciding whether or not 
to display crucifixes in public schools. Thus, the Grand Chamber‘s decision 
indirectly validated the arguments presented by the two Italian Courts.  
The two Courts justified the presence of crucifixes and crosses in public 
schools appealing to the same arguments. Let‘s consider the Veneto 
Administrative Court‘s argument. The Court considered that the display of 
crucifixes in public schools not only does not violate the principle of laicità, but 
that represents and honors it. The Court‘s argument defending the display of 
crucifixes in public schools has four key points.
30
 First, it is worked out from the 
observation that, in Italy, crosses and crucifixes are used interchangeably and 
represent exactly the same values. Second, it is important for the Court to insist 
that crosses are not uniquely religious symbols. Depending on the location of the 
cross, it can have an exclusive religious connotation, as it is the case of the altar in 
a church. However, crosses can perfectly be detached from a religious meaning, 
as it is the case of the Red Cross or the Scandinavian cross in Nordic countries‘ 
national flags. Thus, when a cross is displayed in a public school, it is not 
indented to be interpreted as a religious symbol. Third, the Court argues that the 
fundamental values of the modern secular state, such as religious freedom, 
equality, tolerance, and human dignity, find their origins in the Christian tradition. 
Crosses and crucifixes can be interpreted in a civic way as representations of the 
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values endorsed by modern secular states. Therefore, the Court maintains, 
crucifixes and crosses in public schools must be interpreted as representations of 
the values of the Italian Republic. Fourth, the Court anticipates possible criticisms 
about insensitiveness to non-Christian immigrants and therefore addresses the 
problem of social and cultural integration of foreign students. The civic 
interpretation of the crucifix, the Court holds, enhances values that need to be 
promulgated among foreign students. This promulgation obeys to the intention to 
―transmit principles of openness to diversity and rejection of all 
fundamentalisms—be they religious or secular.‖31The success of such 
transmission of values, the Court maintains, depends upon the symbolic 
reaffirmation of Italian identity.
32
 
This form of secularism has been described as sui generis, ―weak,‖ and 
―confessional‖33 due to its incapacity to guarantee a free and neutral public 
sphere.
34
 An accurate account of the weakness of Italian secularism must consider 
a hitherto neglected fact characteristic of mono-confessional contexts such as the 
Italian, namely, that the closeness to religion derives from the structural 
entrenchment—or the lack of separation—between religious and political 
institutions that have historically characterized the Italian state.  
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Mainstream approaches to the question about the proper role of religion in 
the public sphere identify immigration and its related phenomenon of cultural and 
religious diversity as the most urgent challenges to be dealt with by conceptions 
of secularism. As it is showed by Lautsi, the question about secularism in Italy 
does not refer directly to immigration-related issues, but to the existing closeness 
between the Catholic Church and the institutions of the state.
35
  
Contemporary Western democracies do not have to face the question of 
the proper role of religion in the public sphere similarly. In some cases, the 
question to be addressed may be ‗how can an already secular state promote 
integration of citizens of diverse faiths and cultures?‘ And the answer may 
involve an evenhanded attitude toward new public religious and cultural 
manifestations, as post-secular theorists argue. However, in other cases, the 
question to be addressed may be ‗how can a non-yet secular state promote secular 
political institutions in order to guarantee freedom and equality to all its citizens?‘ 
And the answer may involve the implementation of principles of strict church-
state separation. A proper approach to the Italian case cannot neglect the latter 
question.  
4. Principle of strict separation 
A. Definition  
The principle of church-state separation is traditionally understood as a protection 
of the state from religious interference and of religions from state interference. So 
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 Mancini explains such phenomenon as follows: on the one side, Muslim immigration to Italy 
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conceived, the state would not be converted in the instrument of a particular 
religion and religious institutions would not be instrumentalized by the state. In 
both cases, what is to be protected is religious freedom and, ultimately, freedom 
of conscience.
36
  
The principle of strict separation maintains the spirit of the traditional 
liberal principle of separation, but emphasizes the necessity to embrace a 
defensive strategy against unduly interference within the institutions of the state 
by one or various religious institutions. More concretely, the principle of strict 
separation pleads for a cautionary attitude with regards to Catholic Church‘s 
intervention in politics, which, as I have showed so far, constitutes a fundamental 
reason explaining the weakness of Italian secularism. It seeks to counter-balance 
the privileged position the Catholic Church has within the institutions of the state. 
By entailing a defensive attitude, the principle of strict separation is constituted as 
a principle promoting state‘s action in secularizing the institutions that are not 
secular yet. Differently to the liberal principle of separation, the principle of strict 
separation adopts an active role, for it requires active exclusion of religious 
content already occupying a prominent role within the institutions of the state.
37
  
In practical terms, it entails a removal of concessions made to the Catholic 
Church, including the display of religious symbols in official buildings, tax 
exemptions and incentives, permission for religious education in public schools—
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including the Catholic Church‘s role in assigning the school teachers in charge of 
religious education—, and so on. Naturally, such separation cannot avoid the 
normal vicissitudes of politics, yet the relevant point is the implementation of a 
principle that recognizes the current status of the Catholic Church as a real 
challenge of Italy‘s political secularism instead of the nowadays recurrent 
mentioned ―fact of pluralism‖ as diagnosed by post-secular theorists.38   
The contemporary focus on pluralism among political theorists makes it 
difficult to defend a principle of strict separation. For instance, András Sajó‘s 
defense of constitutional secularism is criticized because of its focus on religion 
instead of on diversity.
39
 Sajó argues that contemporary secular states are too 
weak to face the challenges that ―strong religions,‖ which are politically 
organized religious groups, raise to them. Constitutional secularism, Sajó claims, 
provides the state with stronger institutional resources to face such challenges.
40
 
In contrast, Zucca argues that the weakness of contemporary secular states is not 
to be found in ―strong religions,‖ but in a ―greater malaise: the inability of secular 
states to cope with diversity.‖41 
The principle of strict separation that I am defending assumes ―strong 
religions‖ to be a real challenge for contemporary secular states. However, my 
notion of ―strong religion‖ is thinner than Sajó‘s. Strong religions are religious-
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based political associations that seek to be recognized as political actors. One of 
their main targets is, Sajó argues, is to legitimize their presence in the public 
sphere. His examples of cases reflecting the activity of strong religions is broad 
and somehow puzzling due to its heterogeneity: the Danish cartoon controversy; 
the Rushdie affair; the Canadian Supreme Court considering that secularism is 
compatible with religion-based policy considerations; the Otto-Preminger-Institut 
v. Austria case, in which the ECtHR held that banning a film on the grounds of its 
offensiveness to Christian values was justified; exceptions of laïcité in French 
region of Alsace-Moselle; Indian permissions for personal religious law; and  
Turkish mandatory religious course based exclusively on Sunni Islam.
42
 To this, it 
can perfectly be added the resolution of Lautsi.  
The principle of strict separation I am defending is addressed only to those 
cases in which a political powerful religious institution influences the institutions 
of the state from within and therefore takes advantage of its privileged position to 
either impose its moral doctrine or to reaffirm its social influence. Hence while 
the Canadian Supreme Court has adopted a ―liberal pluralist‖ conception of 
secularism that grants broad accommodations on religious and cultural grounds 
appealing to the values of freedom and equality, I argue throughout this paper that 
the display of crucifixes in the Italian case obeys to a reaffirmation of the 
institutional power the Catholic Church enjoys within the institutions of the Italian 
state.  
Another difficulty a principle of strict separation faces is its association to 
the authoritarian character of French laïcité with regards to Muslim minorities. 
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There is—justified—skepticism about projects that intend to purge ―of the 
political public sphere of all religious contributions.‖43 Contemporary official 
interpretation of laïcité has been labeled as illiberal due to its disproportionate and 
targeted restrictions to religious freedom. Consequently, it is important that the 
principle of strict separation be differentiated from French laïcité. In other words, 
it has to be proven that strict separation constitutes a valid institutional 
arrangement instrumentally promoting the fundamental liberal goals of a liberal 
democracy, namely, freedom of conscience and equal respect.
44
 
 A distinction between ―antireligious‖ and ―anticlerical‖ principles will 
make the difference more clear. The former are a general attitude against 
religion.
45
 Antireligious measures include criticism to religion and the project to 
liberate individuals from the darkness and oppression of religious beliefs, as they 
were referred to by enlightened philosophy.
46
 Criticisms to the French ban on 
―ostentatious religious symbols‖ in public schools denounce a skeptical attitude 
by the French state against some religious (e.g. Islamic) practices. Defenders of 
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the ban conceive as a function of the state the pursuit of women‘s liberation from 
cultural and religious oppression by discouraging, and in some cases banning, the 
use of religious headscarves. The justification of the ban appeals to a conception 
of autonomy that is incompatible with a life of religious observance.
47
  
In contrast, an anticlerical principle focuses on the political power of a 
religious institution. Historically, it has pursued the consolidation of the civic 
authority by assuming functions performed by religious institutions. In other 
words, it intends to transform a political authority that is religiously grounded into 
pure civic authority. Anticlerical principles aim at undermining the power 
religious institutions have within the institutions of the state. An updated version 
of the principle would seek independence from religious interference in the way 
legal regulations ruling the private life of society are carried out. For example, it 
pursuits independence in the way legal regulations about marriage or family life 
are designed. In other words, an anticlerical principle guarantees that decision 
making processes defining the essentials of what would be considered as 
―accepted moralities‖ are done independently of pressures from powerful 
religious organizations.  
An historical example of anticlericalism is the secularization of elementary 
schools in Mexico under Juárez Laws of Reform, which were enacted between 
1859 and 1863, that is, about twenty years before the French ―Laws of 
Education.‖ Juárez political project consisted in advancing liberalism in post-
colonial Catholic Mexico. Unsurprisingly, such project faced the opposition of a 
powerful Catholic Church, which at the time explicitly rejected liberalism, 
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democracy, and religious tolerance. As it is common throughout the world with 
states that tried to implement liberal values, the role of schools was of paramount 
importance, and the success of the liberal project depended to a great extent on the 
success of the secularization of elementary education. The goal was not to 
produce citizens with a negative idea of the Catholic Church, but to consolidate 
the power of the liberal and secular state. For this reason, the secularization of 
schools excluded all religious content from the curriculum but did not promote a 
program that criticized religious doctrines. Furthermore, protections of religious 
freedom, a paramount liberal value, were granted despite the secularization of 
schools and consequently ―academic freedom‖ (libertad de cátedra), a value that 
has little or no importance among early Anglo-Saxon liberals, was erected as a 
political value of uttermost importance within the Mexican liberal system. Under 
the protection of academic freedom, religious freedom in elementary education 
was granted, for religious institutions were free to set religious schools and to 
include in their curriculums religious education.
48
  
Another example is French laïcité interpreted as a ―philosophy of 
neutrality‖49 The 1905 Law of Separation establishes a regime of mutual 
independence between religion and the state, implementing a regime of state‘s 
neutrality. The Law can be interpreted as corresponding to the ―non-establishment 
clause‖ of the First Amendment of the US Constitution and thereby as forbidding 
―all forms of governmental assistance to any religion.‖ In the context it was 
implemented, the Law intended to suppress all the privileges enjoyed by the 
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Laborde, ―On Republican Toleration.‖ 
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Catholic Church and to guarantee equal treatment toward all citizens regardless of 
their religious affiliations. The Law can also be interpreted in terms of the ―free-
exercise clause‖ of the First Amendment. As Cécile Laborde points out, the latter 
interpretation is common among Catholics as it implies support for religious 
activities, historically granted by the French state to the Catholic Church. This 
interpretation, however, fails ―to displace the dominant philosophical 
interpretation of laïcité [as neutrality]‖50 and active commitment to the actual 
exercise of religion is usually seen as a ―pragmatic compromise between the state 
and the Catholic Church in 1905.‖51 Secular republicans interpret concessions to 
the Church as unfortunate exceptions to the Law rather than as principled 
applications of laïcité.
52
 Under this interpretation, the Law is anticlerical and not 
antireligious because it intends to take over the political power of the Catholic 
Church in order to establish a civic and secular political authority that can 
guarantee equal rights to all individuals—not groups—regardless of their religious 
affinities.  
The parallelism between the Italian context with the two historical cases in 
which anticlerical principles were applied helps out to understand their relevance 
and appropriateness. Were it to be applied to the Lautsi case, the principle of strict 
separation would require a straightforward removal of crucifixes from public 
schools and governmental offices.
53
 Moreover, if applied to public education in 
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 Religious iconography of high aesthetic value is pervasive in Italy, so exceptions grounded on 
historic and aesthetic considerations might be granted. However, such reasons might not be valid 
to justify inauguration of religious monuments, such as John Paul II‘s statue at the square of the 
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general, it would imply secularization of school programs, which requires religion 
to be taught in secular terms, that is, as a historical phenomenon. Teachers would 
be public officials and therefore autonomous from the Vatican.  
Thus described, anticlericalism has not much in common with post-secular 
proposals and with open secularism. This must be not surprising. Anticlerical 
institutions intend to promote civic political authority in domains where, on the 
one side, religious institutions have traditionally exercised influence, and, on the 
other side, such influence threatens liberal political values such as freedom of 
conscience or equal respect.
54
 Anticlericalism and post-secularism, liberal 
pluralism, or open secularism intend to address different challenges. The former is 
concerned with excessive powers of a religious institution, while the latter seeks 
peaceful coexistence in a plural—multirreligious, multicultural, multinational, and 
so on—society. However, what they have in common is that both intend to 
promote liberalism and its respect for religion and for diversity. 
 
B. A CLERICAL OBJECTION  
It might be argued that the principle violates the Italian version of secularism, 
which has been defined in terms of the Christian values of tolerance, inclusion, 
and equality. Given that there is an Italian tradition of secularism and that such 
tradition is broadly compatible with liberal and democratic values, the principle of 
strict separation is objectionable for the Italian context. I call this objection the 
                                                                                                                                     
classrooms, migration offices, or police stations can hardly be attributed aesthetic and historical 
value.   
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 This threat is clearly expressed by Rodotà: ―Vatican hierarchy explicitly considered Italy as a 
missionary land, the base land from which a new conquest of the world restarts,‖ Rodotà, Perché 
laico, 16.  
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―clerical objection.‖55 Clerical objectors, namely, the Holy See and the Italian 
official secularism, defend the display of crucifixes at public schools.  
In order to reply to the clerical objection, it would be enough to say that 
state‘s symbolic embracement of a religion—Christianity—sends an exclusionary 
message to citizens not embracing such religion. Furthermore, as Laborde claims, 
the exclusionary message harms such individuals‘ self-respect and therefore 
creates first and second-class citizens.
56
  
Additionally, the Court‘s arguments about the civic interpretation of 
crucifixes are too weak. The claim that a crucifix, or a cross, in a public school 
can be detached from religious—and  thereby sectarian—content and replaced by 
civic values is weak given the strong presence of Catholicism in Italian public life 
and history. Contrary to the opinion of the Court, the cases of Scandinavian 
crosses in North European countries‘ flags and Italian symbolic association with 
the same Christian heritage are not identical. Social secularization, in the third 
sense mentioned above, is greater in Northern Europe than it is in Italy. 
Furthermore, it is plausible to assume that no immediate religious reference 
comes to mind when one faces a, say, Swedish flag with its Scandinavian cross on 
it. This is explained because of the low public visibility of Christian Swedish 
officials and because of the high level of social secularization of north European 
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societies. In other words, the presence of a Scandinavian cross in an official 
symbol does not threaten the secularity of Swedish public sphere in the same level 
as the presence of crucifixes and crosses does in the Italian public sphere. Such 
difference is rooted in the fact that Northern European public spheres are more 
secularized than Italian public sphere.   
The Court‘s claim is even less plausible when analyzed under the light of 
social and cultural integration of foreign students in public schools, many of 
whom come from non-Christian societies. Arguably, a non-Christian student in an 
Italian public school facing a crucifix finds herself contemplating a specifically 
Christian symbol and not a symbol that represents abstract civic values developed 
at the core of European political history and culture. By teaching pupils that 
Christian values—and not Muslim or Buddhist values—crystallized in the values 
of the Italian Republic, public schools are reproducing a hierarchy among 
religions and cultures that is translated into first, second, and third class citizens. 
As Richard Bulliet argues, associating European identity only with Christian 
values neglects cultural contributions from the Islamic world and therefore 
constitutes a serious—and perhaps deliberate—omission of the historic relevance 
non-Christian cultures have played in framing our vision of contemporary western 
culture and its identity.
57
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C. POST-SECULAR OBJECTION 
It can be objected that the unilateral removal of all crucifixes causes division, 
social struggle, or mutual mistrust because it is ultimately grounded in the liberal 
secularist attitude of skepticism toward religious mindsets. This view is adopted 
by post-secular and open secularism theorists.
58
  
Post-secular theorists‘ stand on Lautsi does not defend a principled attitude 
in relation to the display of crucifixes. According to them, processes of 
justification are more important than principled commitments. Zucca‘s 
suggestion, for instance, is to encourage each school to deliberate and confront all 
views, both sectarian and non-sectarian. After deliberation, they can proceed to 
make an informed decision, which will be legitimate given its participatory and 
inclusive character.
59
 According to Habermas, there must be processes of mutual 
learning that include a positive attitude to understand and appreciate contributions 
of Catholicism or Christianity to Italy as a political community. Open secularism 
also argues against principled attitudes toward religious symbols within state 
buildings. For instance, they do not discard the possibility of allowing public 
officials, among them school teachers, to wear with them visibly—ostentatious—
religious symbols if they do not interfere with an impartial exercise of their 
duties.
60
 
  Two arguments can be developed in order to respond to the post-secular 
normative attitude toward Lautsi. First, it can be said that it does not tackle status 
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quo powers and therefore misrepresents the sources of the weakness of Italian 
secularism. Second, it raises unfair burdens to currently oppressed social groups. 
Let‘s consider each at the time.   
Post-secular view‘s attractiveness lies in its pluralist, participatory, and 
deliberative inspiration. However, it risks from perpetuating an environment that 
is already hostile for pluralism to thrive. If we follow Zucca‘s recommendation, 
the Catholic Church keeps its de facto privileges. The display of crucifixes is 
taken as the default situation and deliberation about them would start only when a 
case against crucifixes is made. If in a certain school there is a struggle about 
crucifixes and, if after due deliberation it is consensually decided to maintain 
them exposed, then such display is legitimate and violates nobody‘s freedom of 
conscience. In such not very unlikely scenario, nothing changes from the initial 
measure to the final decision, for crucifixes are still the only religious symbol 
displayed in classrooms. However, inclusive and participatory deliberation makes 
a moral difference, for in the initial stage no valid justification is given to all 
relevant citizens (in this case, the school community), while after deliberation the 
display of crucifixes is properly justified to all relevant citizens.
61
 
According to this line of reasoning, given the initial lack of justification, 
the display of crucifixes is an illegitimate endorsement of a religious symbol, but 
its display after deliberation is legitimate. Keeping crucifixes in public schools 
while waiting struggles to appear is nothing more than maintaining a privilege 
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granted to a religious association until a courageous enough or powerful enough 
organization challenges such status quo. As I have shown in previous sections, in 
mono-confessional societies like the Italian misbalances in power are particularly 
notorious and therefore keeping privileges to the powerful constitutes a 
preservation of an illegitimate use of state power. If we follow the post-secular 
proposal, the privilege of being a symbolically represented institution within 
public schools finds little challenge. Therefore, post-secular approaches to cases 
like Lautsi fall short from correcting status quo illegitimate uses of power. 
Italian secularism is weak because of the partial or unfinished separation 
between the state and the church. This has allowed the latter to preserve its social 
and political power in detriment of other associations, both religious and secular. 
This situation leads to a lack of protection for new manifestations of moral 
pluralism, which find in the entanglement between the church and the state an 
obstacle for their free development. Zucca‘s participatory and inclusivist approach 
to Lautsi ignores this fact and seems to assume that all participants to the debate 
would stand as equals and would have equal possibilities to influence the 
outcome. Zucca, and with him most post-secular theorists, considers that the 
project of guaranteeing equal grounds for participation and inclusion in 
deliberation does not require a previous step in which separation between the state 
and a powerful religious institution has taken place. Without such step, however, 
pluralism can hardly prosper in such a way that constitutes a contestatory 
citizenry that challenges potential illegitimate uses of state power (e.g. display of 
crucifixes.)   
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A second argument against post-secular approaches points out that it raises 
unfair burdens to currently oppressed social groups because it involves the 
presumption of an implicit consent about the acceptability of the display of 
crucifixes in contexts where no complain has been raised yet. It follows from 
Zucca‘s ideas that the reason explaining the absence of cases against crucifixes is 
that they are not a source of discontent and therefore that everybody agrees with 
their display. This consequence is problematic, for the idea of implicit consent 
assumes a homogeneous society that does not find crucifixes in public schools 
objectionable. It can be assumed that nobody raises a case against crucifixes 
because there is either agreement or indifference toward them. In either case, such 
attitude may be motivated by a perception of crucifixes being inoffensive or 
neutral with respect to pupils‘ education and socialization. Legitimacy may be 
defined in terms of a hypothetical deliberation scenario in which all agreed upon 
the display. Since the display of crucifixes is legitimate if it is reasonable to 
assume implicit consent upon them, only homogeneous societies would meet such 
requirement.  
However, the assumption of homogeneity in society is problematic. 
Homogenous societies do not exist, and, in cases in which there is such, it is very 
likely that homogeneity is maintained through the oppressive use of state power.
62
 
Hence, such assumption risks perpetuating—or starting—oppression over certain 
social groups. Expecting potentially excluded groups to raise their claims against 
crucifixes as a first step in the legitimation process of such symbols—or toward 
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their removal—neglects some aspects of the conditions in which oppressed 
groups find themselves within society.  
Iris Marion Young argued about the structural character of oppression, 
which makes it independent from the people‘s choices or policies. Causes of 
oppression, she claims, ―are embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and 
symbols, in the rules underlying institutional rules and the collective 
consequences of following those rules.‖63 A consequence of Zucca‘s proposal is 
that oppressed groups, which are characterized by the internalization and 
normalization of structural oppression, are required to take the first step in 
overcoming their position of marginalization.  
Consider the case of crucifixes in public schools. Dissenters of such 
measure have to take a step forward and start a controversy in order to involve the 
larger community in a deliberation that will generate a consented, informed, 
inclusive, and therefore legitimate decision. However, Zucca does not take in 
consideration the possibility that dissenters of such sort of measures be oppressed 
social groups that may perceive crucifixes as symbols of perpetuation of their 
oppression. Homosexuals, women, immigrants, or non-Catholics might feel 
excluded by the display of crucifixes, for it may be that crucifixes are not 
embraced by their conceptions of the good or moral doctrines, or that crucifixes 
do not represent their cultural and identitarian heritage.  
What is more important, nonetheless, is that oppressed social groups can 
also consider such symbol as representatives of a social and political force that 
impinges their political struggles. Pubic identification as a dissenter of the 
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society‘s majoritarian cultural references can derive in deepening an already 
impoverished situation. The case against crucifixes initiated by Mrs. Soile Lautsi, 
for instance, risked becoming an issue of national identity and integration of 
immigrants. The way society would have reacted were she Muslim, for instance, 
would have evidenced a deep problem involving not only a lack of neutrality and 
secularism within the institutions of the Italian state but also a lack of integration 
of immigrants of non-Christian origin.
64
  
 Summing up, it can be said that, despite being open to pluralism and 
deliberation, the post-secular approach does not face status quo powers and raises 
unfair burdens to oppressed social groups.
65
 Part of belonging to an oppressed 
social group consists in being in a powerless condition,
66
 thus, to expect from the 
worst-off to make a case against the crucifix is to expect them to overcome a 
situation in which they stand in a powerless situation in order to convince a 
majority to modify well established legal, ideological, and cultural assumptions 
about society (e.g. that Italy is a morally homogeneous country).   
 
D. SYMBOLIC V. STRUCTURAL INJUSTICES  
A defense of the post-secular and open secularism positions might raise a counter-
argument by claiming that opening up the possibility for transformation, 
inclusion, and deliberation is already a liberating devise for promoting justice. 
The possibility to jointly decide whether or not a specific public school should 
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display crucifixes concedes the opportunity to transform an exclusionary and 
illegitimate institutional policy into an inclusivist and legitimate one.  
This reaction is not plausible because it overlooks the relevance of the 
second dimension of the question about the proper role of religion in the public 
sphere. Injustices can be grounded on a symbolic basis and on a structural basis. 
Injustices structurally grounded are different from injustices derived from unequal 
treatment by state‘s endorsement of religious iconography. Nussbaum rightly 
describes the unfairness involved in such endorsements by several European 
states, but she does not consider the possibility of unmasking structural injustices 
in some of such symbolic embracement.
67
 State‘s adoption of religious 
iconography (i.e. crucifixes) involves an indirect empowerment of the ideals and 
projects of the religious institution embraced by the state. Nussbaum does not take 
into consideration the fact that adoption of a Catholic symbol within official 
buildings is not only the public manifestation of some degree of closeness 
between the state and what the symbol represents; it is a gesture that serves to 
legitimize a discourse used in politics.  
Consider the status of marriage and the family within Italian legal system, 
which is particularly restrictive in comparison to other state members of the 
European Union. According to Art. 29 of the Italian constitution, a family is ―a 
natural society founded on marriage.‖68 This definition excludes unions that do 
not seek marriage and yet could be considered as families. There is no legislation 
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regulating the status of the so called de facto unions, who find no legal coverture 
as so far as they get involved in family-like situations.
69
 Thus, Italian legislation 
about marriage obliges (heterosexual loving) couples to search for ―state 
legitimation of relationships,‖ as Elizabeth Brake calls them, in order to have 
access to some set of rights and protections that come with the institution of 
marriage.
70
  
Attempts to institutionalize a form of marriage that guarantees equal 
treatment to all members of society have had to overcome the opposition of 
religious organizations (e.g. the Catholic Church). Hence, the Catholic Church has 
an interest in preserving the institution of marriage as it is within the Italian legal 
system. This interest derives from the fact that it protects and privileges the 
conception of marriage promulgated by the Catholic Church.
71
  
The display of crucifixes in public schools is not only a display of a 
symbol belonging to a religion historically linked to the state. It is an 
embracement of an iconography related with a politically influential player in 
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debates that concern reforms aiming at guaranteeing equal treatment by the state 
to all citizenry. The morality defended by the Catholic Church in the case of 
marriage reforms, regardless of whether or not it is presented according to public 
reason requirements, finds reinforcement by the display of the Catholic 
iconography within the institutions of the state (i.e., public schools or 
courtrooms). Crucifixes represent the doctrine emanated by the Vatican and its 
stand in political issues. By displaying the iconography of a politically active 
association, the state is taking sides in debates that divide society and is indirectly 
empowering an already powerful actor.  
This ‗taking sides‘ by the state is not merely symbolic, for it is not just a 
public expression of a symbol that might or might not have religious meaning 
only. If it were only symbolic, the question about the legitimacy of the display of 
crucifixes would be reduced to debates referring to guarantees for equal treatment 
of state‘s endorsement of iconographic representations of the diverse moralities 
constituting society. In this context, perhaps the best way to deal with 
proliferation of claims for equal treatment would be the proposed by post-secular 
theory. However, I the question about secularism in contexts like the Italian, the 
challenge is not only about equal recognition of all faiths and moral doctrines. It is 
also about the excessive power the Catholic Church has within the institutions of 
the state to arbitrarily interfere with decisions that affect the whole society. The 
problem of secularism in Italy, in other words, has to take into consideration that 
the institutions of the state have not completely achieved full independence from 
the Catholic Church. The display of crucifixes in courtrooms or public schools is 
an example of such unfinished process.  
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The possibility for transformation, inclusion, and deliberation that post-
secular and open secularists try to defend risks perpetuating injustices that are 
structural rather than symbolic. To address the problem of deficit of secularism by 
promoting plural participation and inclusiveness, they are assuming that the 
problem of secularism is only about facing new challenges raised by pluralism. 
They are, therefore, neglecting a fundamental political problem, namely, that the 
deficit of secularism is also structurally grounded at the interior of the institutions 
of the state. Separation was not achieved, and therefore the task of guaranteeing a 
neutral public sphere where diversity can freely express was not accomplished. 
The principle of strict separation intends to finish such task.  
5. Concluding Remarks  
In this chapter I have argued that the post-secular approach to the question about 
the proper role of religion in the public sphere overlooks a crucial aspect 
addressed by the traditional conception of secularism as church-state separation. I 
explained this fault by showing that the distinction between pluriconfessional and 
monoconfessional contexts is normatively relevant in order to address the 
question about religion in the public sphere. I appealed to the Italian controversy 
about crucifixes in public schools in order to illustrate the relevance of the 
distinction, for it allows making explicit that in some monoconfessional societies, 
protections of freedom of religion and of conscience depend to a great extent on 
clearly implementing principles of strict church-state separation.  In the last 
section I presented three arguments in favor of a principle of strict separation in 
contexts in which there is a majoritarian and powerful religious institution that 
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uses the institutions of the state to impose its doctrine. I defended the principle of 
strict separation from what I have called the clerical and the post-secular 
objections. Furthermore, I argued that the principle of strict separation advances 
justice better than post-secular approaches because it considers that the active 
presence of a powerful religious institution within the institutions of the state 
constitutes a structurally grounded injustice.  
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